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ABSTRACT 
Why are military organizations resistant to change?  In an attempt to answer this 
question, this thesis proposes the use of systems thinking to evaluate the military and its 
ability to effect change.  Rather than investigate individual components of the 
environment, systems thinking dictates the study of the relationships between system 
components.   We offer two frameworks to examine these relationships.  The prescriptive 
framework, developed via literature, illustrates how each of the military subsystems of 
strategy, doctrine, and organization should interact. The theoretical framework shows 
how these subsystems interact in reality.   A study of the theoretical framework illustrates 
differences from the prescriptive framework and where resistance to change within the 
military system actually occurs.  We find there are many barriers to change to include 
doctrinal rigidity and a legacy force structure that is preserved by a dominant culture, the 
misuse of history, and the inability to learn from past failures.  
Systems thinking, as seen through these frameworks, can apply to every military 
organization and be very useful in not only realizing the need for change but 
understanding how these changes affect the entire system.  More importantly, through 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
I’ll be damned if I see the U.S. Army, its history, its doctrine, its 
institutions, alter just to win this lousy war.1 
     Senior military commander, Vietnam 
In the corporate world, there are many examples of how organizations stay true to 
their established routines for doing business (i.e.,, their strategies, structures and 
processes), in spite of changes in the competitive landscape of their industry.  For 
instance, in the 1990s Eastman-Kodak senior executives might have felt the sentiments of 
the Vietnam commander quoted above, saying something like, “I’ll be damned if I’m 
going to let the digital camera boom distract me from being the leading producer of film 
in the world.”  In fact, why should Eastman-Kodak’s leaders work to change its main 
production output from film to digital cameras?  Current profitability had not declined, 
and Kodak’s leaders believed “that its legendary marketing could postpone the 
inevitable” switch from film to digital.2  However, when profits suffered a ninety-three 
percent decline in 2001, Kodak did go into crisis mode and realized it had to discard its 
traditional film output in order to remain viable.3 
Kodak subsequently went “all-in” to the digital camera market and emerged as a 
leader in the digital camera industry.  But as a recent BusinessWeek article observed, 
Kodak’s future is far from certain.  Profits from digital cameras are not nearly as 
favorable as those from film and processing services, and Kodak has yet to recover from 
eight consecutive quarters of hemorrhaging profits.  In an effort to save the company, 
Kodak’s CEO determined it was time to change the business model that had sustained the 
company since 1880, as “many of Kodak’s problems can be traced to the successes of its 
past.”4  Kodak is learning the same lesson that the U.S. military in Vietnam learned: 
                                                 
1 Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War (New York: Avon Books, 1981), 195. 
2 Steve Hamm and William C. Symonds, “Mistakes Made On The Road To Innovation,” 
BusinessWeek, November 27, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_48/b4011421.htm 
(accessed January 17, 2007). 
3 “Company News; Eastman Kodak Profits Fell 93% in 2nd Quarter,” New York Times Magazine, July 
18, 2001, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04EFD71F3BF93BA25754C0A9679C8B63 
(accessed January 17, 2007). 
4 Hamm and Symonds. 
2 
“Don’t confuse what your company does with how it does it.”5  That is, the business 
model (i.e., doctrine) and institutions that made Kodak successful are now hindrances to 
future success. 
So how do an organization’s participants realize the need to change or adjust to 
meet the changed demands of the environment?  And when people arrive at the 
realization of the need to change, how do they persuade others to take action in the same 
manner?  In an unstable and complex environment, the need for constant change is often 
in conflict with the mechanisms that have been put in place to reduce uncertainty within 
an organization.6  The resistance created by this natural conflict may stifle change, 
leading to degraded performance or even extinction.7  To complicate matters, well-
intended, reactive change may be instituted without regard for the second and third order 
effects that are generated.  Luck prevails if these ordered effects do not adversely affect 
the outcome.  More often than not, Murphy has his hand in the situation, and these effects 
are surprising and significant. 
As exemplified by the Vietnam commander’s quote, “I’ll be damned if I see the 
U.S. Army, its history, its doctrine, its institutions, alter just to win this lousy war,” the 
United States military is not immune from organizational inertia.  That commander is 
aware that those things he values are not going to help him win the war.  More 
importantly, he is – astonishingly – willing to sacrifice this objective in order to preserve 
U.S. Army history, doctrine, and the institutions. 
In short, the United States cannot afford to have its military fail.  How do military 
leaders realize that their ‘business model’, the strategy, doctrine, and organizational 
structure that brought the military to this present state will not be the same as that which 
will further the United States’ security position in the future?  Much like the situation that 
Kodak found itself in, it is possible that more than different military outputs may be 
required to operate in today’s environment.  The military may need to adjust the means 
by which it achieves the desired ends. 
                                                 
5 Hamm and Symonds. 
6 Erik Jansen, (class lecture, Organizational Design for Special Operations, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, March 2006). 
7 Edward E. Lawler III, Built to Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 11. 
3 
In this thesis, we explain how the military remains steeped in tradition and 
doctrine, causing it to struggle with the concept of change and impeding its embracing 
innovative strategies.  Failure to generate ideas that allow the military to achieve the 
goals set by the civilian authorities has the potential to bring about the demise of the 
United States.  Military leaders need to have a wealth of tools with which to accurately 
detect changes in their environment and then take appropriate measures to remain viable.  
The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, stressed the 
need for this capability. 
In today's world, there ought to be a premium for people who are thinking, 
innovative and are willing to take appropriate risks. If you don't try, and 
you stay locked in the doctrine that brought you there, you're going to fail. 
You are not going to be as good as you can be in terms of efficiency in the 
battlespace, and you're probably going to hurt your people. You've got to 
adapt.8 
Observations like those of General Myers lead us to our research question: Why 
are military organizations resistant to change? 
This thesis attributes the painstakingly slow change process to an insufficient 
framework for assimilating the relationships between the strategic, technological, 
doctrinal, and organizational components of the military’s internal environment.  A major 
by-product of this situation is a culture that holds organization and doctrine static, 
creating disequilibrium between the military and its external environment. 
Militaries try to influence the external environment through changes in the 
strategic, doctrinal, and organizational areas.  The difficulty lies in being able to frame 
the relevant environmental factors in such a manner as to be able to attain the desired end 
state without adverse affects in the other areas.  As the environment becomes more 
complex and unstable, these tasks often appear to be insurmountable.9 
                                                 
8 Jim Garamone, “Myers: Changing Military Culture Key to Transformation,” DefenseLink, October 6, 
2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/n10062004_2004100603.html (accessed September 6, 
2006). 
9 Joseph E. McCann and John Selsky, “Hyperturbulence and the Emergence of Type 5 Environments,” 
Academy of Management Review 9, no. 3 (1984): 460, 
http://www.jstor.org/view/03637425/ap010035/01a00070/0 (accessed September 1, 2006).  
4 
In 1990, Peter Senge of MIT’s Sloan School of Business popularized an approach 
that many claim enables organizations to cope with dynamic environments; the approach 
asserted that the solution was to become a learning organization.  In his book, The Fifth 
Discipline, Senge defines the learning organization as one “where people continually 
expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive 
patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people 
are continually learning to see the whole together.”10  Drawing from concepts developed 
in management and social studies, he lists five “disciplines” that are integral to achieving 
this capacity and emphasizes the fifth discipline of systems thinking.11  Senge provides 
many examples that show how people take action without consideration of how those 
actions will affect other parts of the organization.  It is difficult to learn from these 
decisions because the effects of the actions take place in other parts of their 
environment.12 
The idea of the learning organization is not new to the military.  For example, in 
the 1996 book, Hope Is Not a Method, General Gordon R. Sullivan claims the army had 
made the transition to a learning organization.  However, counter to General Sullivan’s 
views, Colonel Stephen J. Gerras argues that while the army espouses that it has become 
a learning organization, it has never made the cultural shift to truly exercise the 
disciplines that Senge put forth.13  In line with Gerras’ argument, we find that the military 
does not promote the five disciplines as a cohesive method for recognizing the need to 
change, and it neglects giving its members the tools to use systems thinking to frame the 
internal and external environment. 
Overwhelming complexity in today’s environment makes the need for systems 
thinking ever more necessary.  Systems thinking enables people to see interrelationships 
rather than linear cause and effect chains; to see processes of change rather than 
                                                 
10 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: 
DoubleDay/ Currency, 1990), 3. 
11 For further information, see Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, Organizational Learning: A 
Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978). 
12 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 27-54; NOTE: Senge’s “Beer Game” is especially illustrative of these 
concepts. 
13 Stephen J. Gerras, “The Army as a Learning Organization” (Master’s Thesis, US Army War 
College, March 3, 2002) http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404754 (accessed July 19, 2006). 
5 
snapshots frozen in time.14  Systems thinking allows members of an organization to 
dynamically frame its environment in order to use adaptively different strategies to 
accomplish goals.  The old saying goes, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, every 
problem looks like a nail.”  It is time for the military to assess the problem first and then 
determine if another tool needs to be created.  Rather than try to apply its conventional 
hammer to every problem, members of the organization can use systems thinking as a 
framework to identify possible areas for change in order for the organization to remain 
viable in a dynamic environment. 
In this thesis, we illustrate how systems thinking can provide a powerful 
framework for organizing environmental variables.  In chapter two, we explore the 
definitions of change and systems thinking.  In chapter three, we discuss how the so-
called learning organization has been relegated to a catch all term by authors and military 
leaders alike.  Not only has the military instituted the learning organization haphazardly, 
but the meaning of the learning organization is so diluted that it does not resonate with 
military members.  The foundation of the thesis is based on two frameworks presented in 
chapters four and five.  We present our prescriptive framework of military subsystems in 
chapter four.  The prescriptive framework is derived from literature concerning military 
strategy, doctrine, and organizational theory.  Here, we explain the desired relationships 
between the subsystems that the military has the power to change and those subsystems 
that are in the military’s external environment.  In chapter five, we present our theoretical 
framework of how the military subsystems interact.  This framework portrays how the 
military subsystems interact from our point of view.  It highlights how change is 
normally carried out by the military, and we can then see the barriers the military faces 
while trying to achieve effective change.  The systems thinking framework also helps to 
identify the leverage points within each system to implement effective change.  In 
conclusion, military leaders need to cultivate systems thinking skills as a means to frame 
the environment to develop and carry out military strategy which will bolster our national 
security. 
                                                 
14 Virginia Anderson and Lauren Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops 
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II. DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 
In order to present a clear picture of our concepts, we must first establish some 
working definitions.  Specifically, we address the concepts of change, paradigms, open 
and closed systems, and systems thinking. 
A. CHANGE 
Webster’s Dictionary defines change as something, “to make different in some 
particular” or “to replace with another”.15  Dr. Andrew Van de Ven defines institutional 
change as “a difference in form, quality, or state over time in an institution.”16  To 
determine if change has occurred, one has to take measurements of a particular set of 
variables at two different times, and determine if there is a difference between the two 
sets of data.  Change occurs in the external and internal environment of an organization – 
organizational theorists claim it is an organization’s goal to keep the internal changes at a 
pace close to that of the external changes.17 
Change within organizations, including military organizations, occurs on a daily 
basis where members take deliberate action to solve problems that stem from a dynamic 
environment.  To many within the organization this frequent attempt to change 
constitutes the change in its entirety – even though the variable that the change was 
directed at remains the same.  To these people, accusations such as “the military is slow 
to change” seem incorrect.  Yet according to Dr. Van de Ven’s definition, the act of 
change does not constitute change itself; much less assure internal changes keep pace 
with external changes.  In this sense, the word “change” is used with varying denotative 
meanings that tends to create confusion or a false sense of accomplishment. 
Nadler and Tushman organize types of change according to two factors: whether 
the change is anticipatory or reactive and whether the change is incremental or strategic.  
These types of change are depicted in Figure 1.                                                  
15 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, “Change,” http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/change (accessed 
August 23, 2006). 
16 Timothy J. Hargrave, and Andrew H. Van de Ven, “A Collective Action Model of Institutional 
Innovation,” Academy of Management Review 31, no. 4 (2006): 866, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=22527458&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
(accessed January 10, 2007).  
17 Peter Senge et al., The Dance of Change (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 14.  
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Figure 1.   Types of Change18 
 
Incremental changes can affect little or all of an organization, but they “usually 
occur within the existing definition and frame of reference of the organization.”19  
Strategic change affects the whole of the organization and “fundamentally redefines what 
the organization is or its basic framework.”20  Other organizational theorists categorize 
strategic change as “transformational change”.  In his book, Built to Change, Edward 
Lawler explains that, “Transformational change is associated with fundamental shifts in 
the organization’s strategy, organization design, and processes.”21 
There is consensus that strategic changes are necessary during the life span of an 
organization, yet these changes do not assure the longevity of the organization.  “While 
strategic organization change does not guarantee success, those organizations that fail to 
change, generally fail to survive.”22  Lawler remarks that this type of change is 
“particularly likely to be inadequate, too late, or poorly managed.”23 
The reactive or anticipatory nature of action implies different risks for strategic 
change.  Re-orientations are generally more successful, although there is greater risk 
associated with making strategic bets on the future.  Re-creations are riskier overall 
                                                 
18 David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman, “Beyond the Charismatic Leader: Leadership and 
Organizational Change,” California Management Review 32, no. 2 (1990): 80, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4762422&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
(accessed January 10, 2007).  
19 Nadler and Tushman, 79. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lawler, 11. 
22 Nadler and Tushman, 80. 
23 Lawler, 11. 
9 
because they are enacted in crisis situations that involve time constraints.  Also, because 
“re-creations almost always involve a change in core values” there is likely to be more 
resistance to change within the organization.24 
Allen Imershein applies Thomas Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm change” to 
organizational change.25  This type of change is tied to the perceptions an organization 
holds.  Kuhn claims that scientists act to confirm what they already know.  A paradigm is 
a “universally recognized scientific achievement which for a time provides model 
problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.”26  Those events that do not fit 
the discipline’s established paradigm (anomalies) often are ignored.  It generally takes 
outsiders or newcomers to the established discipline, such as Albert Einstein in the 
physics discipline, to create a new way of making sense of the discipline’s problems, 
including the problematic anomalies.  They are thus able to provide a challenge to the 
established paradigm.  Once the members of the discipline accept the new paradigm, 
there is a fundamental shift in how scientists view the causal reason for events.27  Kuhn’s 
work is significant in pointing out that even physicists, viewed as objective and open-
minded in their observations and sense-making, have great difficulties in “getting out of 
the box” of their habitual ways of engaging problems. 
Following Imershein, we can argue that actors in military organizations also share 
paradigms that they rely on to solve the problems that they face.  Paradigms provide 
military professionals with ways of thinking, defining, and solving “model” problems.  In 
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, Donald Rumsfeld discussed the need for a 
“paradigm shift” within the Department of Defense.28  According to Kuhn, individuals or 
organizations can not set out to change a paradigm in an intellectual vacuum.  Individuals 
develop new paradigms because the existing mental models or theories can not make 
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sense of what is happening and solve new problems.  Even after “severe and prolonged 
anomalies”, experts are hard pressed to discount a paradigm.29  It is evident that an 
organization must be sensitive to noticing and attributing these anomalies as such in order 
to spur a grand change. 
Change processes are important to understand in order to implement effective 
change.  However, the scope of this paper is limited to examining how systems thinking 
allows military organizations to recognize the need to change.  As with the types of 
change, change processes in practice are complicated and take many forms.  Van de Ven 
and Hargrave describe four models of institutional change: institutional design, 
institutional adaptation, institutional diffusion, and collective action.  These models 
describe change processes that vary in the deliberateness of the change and who initiates 
the change.30  Each step of these change processes needs to be successful for change to 
occur, yet each presents unique problems.31  Further research is necessary to determine 
how and by which processes to implement change within military organizations. 
B. SYSTEMS THINKING 
The interdependent nature of events in the Information Age makes systems 
thinking a critical tool for analyzing one’s environment.  Rather than investigate 
components of the environment individually, systems thinking dictates the study of 
interactions between the components.  This difference between traditional thinking and 
systems thinking makes it very effective for complex issues, issues that have dependence 
on the actions of others, and issues which stem from ineffective coordination of the 
people involved.32  Those in the military very often deal with these types of issues. 
When using systems thinking, it is helpful to categorize one’s system as either 
relatively “closed” or “open”.  In relatively closed systems, activities may be influenced 
by outside events, but there is little exchange of work between the unit and the outside 
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environment.33  Relationships between variables are relatively easy to determine and are 
fairly predictable in nature.  An organization can make changes within its boundaries and 
those changes will have little effect on the external environment. 
On the other hand, actions in relatively open systems have an effect on an 
organization’s external environment, and vice versa.  Open systems consist of “a group of 
interacting, interrelated, or interdependent components that form a complex and unified 
whole.”34  Military members encounter open systems at the higher levels of the military 
bureaucracy as well as on the battlefield.  Elliot Jaques describes levels within an 
organization based on the time it takes to complete tasks.  When the time span is over 
five years, Jaques contends these individuals are operating in an open system.35  In his 
view, this is the threshold at which variables from the external environment will have an 
effect on a particular project.  For example, those involved on the budgetary process or 
working as a weapons system program manager operate in an open system. 
The emerging threat of non-state actors offers an example of a particular type of 
open system called a complex adaptive system (CAS).  A complex adaptive system is: 
self-organizing, adaptive, sensitive to initial conditions, and is vulnerable to minor 
events.36  In his study of effects based operations, Dr. Edward Smith describes how CAS 
concepts describe the relationship between the United States and the insurgents within 
Iraq.  Dealings between the two are related such that today’s actions are shaped by past 
actions, which shape tomorrow’s actions.  As a result, “in a system of complex adaptive  
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systems, there can be no return to status quo ante because the very fact that a cycle has 
taken place alters the starting point for all succeeding cycles.”37  This obviously has great 
implications when shaping strategy for future conflict. 
If the military’s environment has the characteristics of a complex adaptive system, 
it is evident that systems thinking is another way for senior leaders to view their 
environment  Taking into consideration the interactions of organizational components, 
rather than focusing on just one, can set the stage for effective change actions.  
Oftentimes, problems in one area may be symptomatic of problems in another area.  
Systems thinking allows managers and leaders to identify these situations and identify 
leverage points for change actions.  In any type of change, whether it is a Re-organization 
or Tuning, systems thinking provides a framework to categorize the variables within the 
dynamic environment the military works in today.  This is the reason why Peter Senge 
includes it in his ‘five disciplines’ for a learning organization. 
Senge’s claim that learning organizations “expand their capacity to create the 
results they truly desire” must be enticing to many organizations, not just the military.38  
Change is difficult in any organization, much less the bureaucratic behemoth of the U.S. 
military.  The next chapter discusses the reasons why and how elements of the U.S. 
military implemented the disciplines of the learning organization. 
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III. THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION IN REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
When analyzing why military leadership chose the learning organization as the 
conceptual tool to facilitate change, it is important to first understand the roots of the 
concept.  This chapter begins with the conceptualization of the learning organization as 
expressed by organizational theorists and both former and current military commanders.  
Then, we examine the military’s interpretation of the concept through the framework of 
the learning organization. 
B. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
The learning organization is a concept that has developed out of the research of 
many organizational theorists.  Donald Schön provided a framework for the idea of a 
“learning system”: a system capable of continuous transformation, based on the idea that 
with increasing change comes a greater need for learning.39  Eric Hoffer emphasized this 
point: 
It is indeed remarkable how many of our present difficulties would be 
mitigated or even removed in a learning society…. [A] learning society 
would have a decided advantage in a time of rapid change: while the 
learned usually find themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer 
exists, the learner adjusts himself readily to all sorts of conditions.40 
Schön, along with Chris Argyris, went on to publish both Organizational 
Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (1978), and Organizational Learning II: 
Theory, Method, and Practice (1996), works that have proven critical to gaining an 
understanding of learning within organizations.  In 1987, Bob Garratt coined the term 
“learning organization” to describe simply an organization that stressed the need for 
collective learning.41 
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It is with this background that Peter Senge began to formalize the concept of the 
learning organization. In his book, The Fifth Discipline, he constructed a framework for 
the learning organization. For an organization to be flexible, adaptive and productive in 
order to excel, he argues that organizations need to “discover how to tap people’s 
commitment and capacity to learn at all levels.”42   He stresses that it is not just learning 
for survival but “generative learning” that enhances an organizations capacity to create 
and sustain its ability to learn.  In fact, Senge goes so far as to say that, “the rate at which 
organizations learn may become the only sustainable source of competitive advantage.”43  
It may be this latter statement that made the idea so intriguing to the military. 
C. THE U.S. MILITARY’S INTERPRETATION 
Since Joint Vision 2020 and other documents have expressed the need for the 
military to be more flexible and adaptable, it is clear why the military has adopted the 
learning organization as its conceptual tool.  Yet the lack of success with implementation 
begs the question: What does the military think a learning organization truly is?  In a 
master’s thesis regarding the U.S. Army in the Philippine War (1899-1902), Major Abb 
concluded that: 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI 
Operations (1 August 1994), states the US Army must continually seek to 
operate as a learning organization… However the [U.S.] Army has not 
elaborated on what it truly means to practice the art of a learning 
organization within the military realm, nor has it established a doctrine on 
how to bring about a military learning organization…44 
General Schoomaker himself has used the concept in briefs to the House 
Committee for Armed Services, and he has supported further research on the topic. 
General (Ret) Gordon Sullivan and his consultant Michael Harper wrote their book, Hope 
is Not a Method, in the wake of the U.S. Army’s major transformation in the 1990s.  In 
this book, they claim that “the army has transformed itself into a learning organization, 
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maybe the foremost learning organization in the world.”45  Richard Downie examines 
learning within the military by examining three case studies to compare and contrast 
change in doctrine.  These cases include the U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine in 
Vietnam, El Salvador and the Army’s counter-drug doctrine.  The most recent discussion 
of the learning organization within the military comes from John Nagl’s book, Learning 
to Eat Soup with a Knife.  Nagl looks at two different case studies, the U.S. in Vietnam 
and the British in Malaya.  He explains the ways that each learned or didn’t learn during 
their counterinsurgency efforts concluding that the British military is a learning 
organization while the U.S. military is not. 
Examination of this research illustrates that there is a need for a tool to help the 
military cope with its environment and the army has selected the learning organization as 
the tool.  In addition to the Army, organizations within the Air Force have adopted the 
learning organization concept.  But is it the right tool for the military as a whole?  Has the 
army chosen the right one?  The following section seeks to answer these questions. First, 
we explain the difference between Organizational Learning and the learning organization 
and the significance of this difference.  Second, we analyze the learning organization 
framework as it applies to the military.  Finally, we provide an in depth look into the 
concept of systems thinking.  
D. THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION VS. ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEARNING 
Critics of the learning organization, such as Matthias Finger and Silvia Burgin 
Brand, argue that the learning organization concept is still very vague.46  And there is still 
constant debate as to the distinction between the concept of Organizational Learning and 
a learning organization, since one is founded on the other. Ang and Joseph distinguish the 
two in terms of “process versus structure.”47 In his own literature review, Anders 
Ortenblad supports this argument: 
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… The two most common ways to distinguish between organizational 
learning and learning organization in existing literature are that learning 
organization [sic] is a form of organization while organizational learning 
[sic] is activity or processes (of learning) in organizations, and that 
learning organization needs efforts [sic] while organizational learning 
exists without any efforts.48 
This understanding, however, has yet to permeate through the military. A review 
of Sullivan and Harper’s, Hope is Not a Method, illustrates an example of this confusion. 
Sullivan and Harper introduce change as having a “dual nature”: both a condition and a 
process.  As a condition it is external and must be accepted as natural; as a process it is 
internal and is “ours to influence.”49 Their concept of change as a process runs parallel to 
that of Ang and Joseph’s description of Organizational Learning. 
However, Sullivan and Harper’s fundamental argument to why the army is and 
has been a learning organization is founded solely around particular learning processes; 
specifically, the implementation of the After Action Reviews, or AARs.  There are three 
questions asked in an AAR: What happened? Why did it happen? What should we do 
about it?  It is with these questions, they argue, that the Army has a tool to assist in the 
learning process.  It is a structured feedback process that is supposed to be open, all 
inclusive, and painfully honest.  By way of incorporating the fundamental elements of 
trust and feedback to foster participation and innovation, it is possible to learn from each 
situation.50  In essence, AARs are an effective tool to facilitate Organizational Learning 
but are not enough to declare the group to be a learning organization.  In their article 
“Adapt or Die”, Brigadier General Fastabend and Robert Simpson address how this is 
true, but note that it has not permeated up and down the organization’s hierarchy. 
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… It is difficult to overstate the impact of the AAR on the Army. It is such 
an important part of the warfighting culture today that we forget it is 
relatively new. Its strength is derived from the inclusion of the entire team 
in the process, its “no-holds-barred” honest self-criticism and its ubiquity. 
Although widely embedded in our tactical training, Army institutional 
processes have not incorporated AARs to the same extent. To create a 
culture of innovation in the institutional Army requires that horizontal and 
vertical AAR processes be integrated into normal office battle rhythms, 
just as they exist as a normal part of all training.51 
This incorporation of AARs into the army’s culture and institution is the effort 
that is required in truly becoming a learning organization.  Sullivan and Harper provide 
clear evidence of the military’s capacity for organizational learning.  However, the claim 
that the U.S. Army is the “foremost learning organization” is far from accurate.  The 
reliance on the AAR “process” only provides one piece of the puzzle when trying to grow 
a true learning organization and structure. 
Nagl’s work provides another example of how the terms Organizational Learning 
and the learning organization have been used incorrectly.  In his first chapter, Nagl uses 
Richard Downie’s definition for change: “a process by which an organization (such as the 
U.S. Army) uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to 
adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize 
previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”52  He then defines another 
key term he calls institutional memory as “the conventional wisdom of an organization 
about how to perform its tasks and missions.”53  Using these two definitions, he 
concludes that it is in doctrine that the army codifies its institutional memory, and he 
claims the “published nature” of this doctrine is “convincing evidence of change.” 54   He 
also says that learning is demonstrated through curricula in military schools and Lessons 
Learned published by “flexible, responsive military institutions.”55  In the end both 
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military curriculum and lessons learned contribute significantly to the development of 
military doctrine. He claims the process of doctrinal change he provides is an efficient 
way to track the development of learning in military organizations. Nagl uses his process 
to determine if the British and United States’ militaries were learning organizations.  His 
results are interesting, suggesting that after a key turn in 1952, the British did show signs 
of organizational learning by accepting new forms of warfare to gain the advantage and 
eventually maintaining a successful counterinsurgency campaign.  On the other hand, the 
Americans, although technologically innovative throughout the campaign, never truly 
“learned” what was necessary in order to be successful. His conclusion then is that the 
British Army in Malaya, was a learning organization but the U.S. Army in Vietnam was 
not. 
Given the difference between the two terms, the process of Organizational 
Learning is evident.  However, there is no evidence that there is structure or a 
continuation of efforts that shows the British Army was a learning organization.  With 
regard to the methodology of using case studies to determine if a military organization 
has been a learning organization, it is important to be aware that the case studies are a 
snapshot in time.  Major Abb’s study of the U.S. Army in the Philippine War through the 
framework of the learning organization comes closer to proving that more than just 
organization learning has occurred.  Yet her conclusion still is limited by the fact that her 
analysis only covers the three years of conflict.56 
What do these studies tell us about our army now? The sustained ability to learn 
and adapt to change is fundamental to being a learning organization.  And for the 
purposes of classifying a group as a learning organization, evidence of Organizational 
Learning is not enough. We can not say that the U.S. Army was not a learning 
organization in Vietnam, but was one in the Philippines.  The fact that learning occurs 
during these case studies does give hope, since the fundamentals, the processes, such as 
AARs, are there.  However, as Sullivan states, “Hope is Not a Method.” 
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E. LEARNING ORGANIZATION FRAMEWORK – THE FIVE 
DISCIPLINES 
The following section extrapolates Senge’s Five Disciplines of the learning 




Figure 2.   The Five Disciplines of a Learning Organization57 
 
 
1. Personal Mastery 
Inherent to the learning organization is a shift in our way of thinking; one needs to 
be willing to see things from a different perspective and be open to deficiencies and 
criticisms.  Personal mastery is the discipline of “continually clarifying and deepening 
our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing 
reality objectively” 58  This discipline is already fundamental to the military organization 
partly through education and intensive job training.  Yet there is a need for more than just 
a focus on experts in the field.  Personal Mastery requires critical thinkers willing to 
commit to this shift of mind.  A majority of military personnel are educated and advanced 
by the military organization.  Postgraduate education is required for promotion to senior 
ranks throughout the services.  However, the content and scope of this education, as well 
as its availability, call into question the true significance of intellectual capital in the 
military. 
The value that the officer corps places on intellectual development of their junior 
and senior officers is critical to understanding the system they operate in.  While in the 
aftermath of World War I, the U.S. military began a serious study of the profession of 
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PERSONAL MASTERY – Clarifying and deepening personal vision 
SHARED VISION – Create vision of future to create the need for change 
TEAM LEARNING – Overcome fear of conflict to challenge others’ thinking 
MENTAL MODELS – Models to overcome ingrained assumptions which influence 
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SYSTEMS THINKING – Contemplating the whole, not just one part 
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arms.  “The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) established twenty separate boards to 
examine the lessons of the war… a considerable effort to come to grips with the harsh 
lessons of the Western Front.”59  Today this continues through the service schools and 
Knowledge Management tools such as the Army Knowledge Online website. 
Though it is extremely important for military personnel to gain operational 
experience in the form of combat, tactical training, and specific unit assignment, 
intellectual development outside the unit is becoming less and less a priority.  Because of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT), we are beginning to see a conflict between the time 
available for an officer to immerse herself in intellectual study and the time required in a 
“muddy boot” billet.  According to Murray and Millet, “the Naval War College remains 
the finest institution of its kind in the world, but unfortunately the navy still resolutely 
refuses to send its officers to school.”60  In order to achieve Personal Mastery as a 
discipline, this needs to be corrected. 
This lack of emphasis is seen throughout the naval ranks. Surface Warfare 
Officers in the Navy, desiring a non-technical curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, now have to compete for their assignment.61  These non-technical curriculums 
include the MBA program and National Security Affairs.  There is no contention that 
there will always be value in our naval leaders to have the technical expertise to 
understand the platform upon which they serve.  Yet upon graduation, these men and 
women will not be judged so much on their knowledge of engineering or computers but 
on how they lead, manage, and make decisions.  Obviously, the military needs both kinds 
of people within its ranks.  However, the military underestimates the time and 
deliberateness required in order to cultivate and breed critical thinkers. The military also 
displays this attitude towards the instructor corps of professional military education.  
Colonel Robert Killebrew argues that “a teaching assignment at a service school should - 
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must - be once again a prestigious and career-enhancing assignment in the services.”62 
The military organization's desire to decrease the number of civilian instructors in order 
to purchase sophisticated computer systems, and its desire to decrease the time officers 
spend in the institutions, “reflect the attitudes of both the larger military culture and 
society: profoundly anti-intellectual.”63  This will lead to a decrease in intellectual 
capital.  As a result, military organizations become less capable or likely to shift or 
develop alternative strategies before, during, or after conflict.  A serious practice in 
Personal Mastery and an investment in intellectual capital within military organizations 
will pay large dividends in adaptation, flexibility, and innovation of the force. The 
upsetting possibility is that the military may be waning in its profession of arms, when 
our nation needs its military leaders to reclaim the intellectual high ground the most, due 
to an ever changing threat environment. 
2. Team Learning 
The discipline of Team Learning is viewed as “the process of aligning and 
developing the capacities of a team to create the results its members truly desire.”64 This 
discipline starts with the capacity of members of a team to suspend assumptions and enter 
into a genuine thinking together. Senge calls this collective thinking “dialogue”.65 
In 1994, General Sullivan challenged the Commandant of the U.S. Army War 
College (USAWC) to become the model learning organization for the army.  Colonel 
Peter Bucha in his thesis, The US Army War College: A Model Learning Organization for 
the Army?, uses a survey and his understanding of Senge’s Five Disciplines to determine 
what progress had been made since this challenge. His thesis has two objectives: “to 
provide insight as to whether the USAWC is perceived to be a model learning 
organization” and “to identify traits of the Army War College that are both consistent and 
inconsistent with the traits of a learning organization.”66  This evaluation is not 
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representative of the army as a whole, but it does illustrate the need for a synergy of all 
the disciplines and how the lack thereof affects the learning process. 
Students, faculty and the leadership were surveyed randomly for both quantitative 
and qualitative responses.  Respondents were given the definition of a learning 
organization and asked to name three traits that were consistent with the definition and 
three traits that were inconsistent with the definition.  According to the students and 
faculty, consistent traits were: “seminar or Team Learning,” and “open, honest and non-
judgmental atmosphere.”67  In some respects Team Learning, as well as Personal 
Mastery, seem to be something that comes easily to the military.  However, these 
capabilities are insufficient – although necessary – for a learning organization. 
3. Building Shared Vision 
Shared vision is “the capacity to hold a shared picture of the future we seek to 
create.”68  When there is this genuine vision, people excel and learn, not because they are 
told to, but because they want to.  However, in the military many leaders have personal 
visions, or “vision statements”, that are never translated into shared visions that galvanize 
an organization. 
Colonel Bucha’s study showed that the discipline of building shared discipline 
was not evident from the perspective of the USAWC students and faculty.  The traits that 
were inconsistent with Shared Vision were: “top-driven requirements”, “too much 
conflict between departments” and the “dissynchronization between leadership/academic 
board and the seminar learning”.69  With the exception of traits such as the 
commandant’s vision/ future focus, collegiality, and the ability to create, experiment, and 
discover, the leadership observed additional inconsistencies such as “conflict between 
departments” and “too many top driven requirements”.70  In this case, the vision of the 
commandant was not enough to facilitate sharing throughout the organization. 
In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General 
Schoomaker gave insight to this topic: 
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The strength of a football team is not the play that is called in the huddle 
and how well everybody knows the playbook. The strength of the team is 
when you get to the line of scrimmage and the ball gets snapped, what 
happens when everything changes? That is the difference, and that is the 
kind of Army we need. We have to have a common basic starting point, 
but, boy, once the ball has snapped, you know, we have to have people 
that understand the intent, understand what the end state is supposed to be 
and understand how they can contribute.”71 
This “common basic starting point” that he speaks to is the shared vision that is 
needed not only in the Army but throughout the entire military system. 
4. Mental Models 
Mental models are “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even 
pictures and images that influence how we understand the world and how we take 
action.”72 In a military organization our mental models are more than deeply ingrained.  
The come to us in the form of our core values, our codes of conduct, and even in 
doctrine.  This discipline allows us to “turn the mirror inward,” realize our models and 
assumptions, and hold them to the closest of scrutiny.73 
These models however can be a benefit or a hindrance to how the military views 
doctrine, strategy and even its own organization. Sullivan and Harper suggest the concept 
of doctrine as “an engine of change” to support how the Army was able to come up with 
new ideas on how to fight.  Sullivan and Harper define this doctrine as “not what to think, 
but how to think”; because of the competitive nature of its missions and the dynamics of 
its environment, the military is forced to constantly reevaluate how it operates.74  It is this 
aspect of doctrine that proves learning occurs within the military. 
In theory, doctrine as an engine of change works, but there is a danger that 
doctrine may get set in stone.  If doctrine is to guide the military in “how to think,” 
certain mental models can form such as “find, fix and finish”.  The tendency is to fit the 
problem to that doctrine well before realizing that it may be the doctrine that needs to be  
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changed.  By scrutinizing these mental models with respect to the current environment, it 
allows for a critical look as to whether these models are hindering or enabling the success 
of the overall mission. 
Evidence of each of the disciplines described above can be seen in the military.  
Some are in practice more so than others with varied success.  One example of successful 
implementation of the whole learning organization concept is Seattle’s Engineer District. 
The Engineer District’s competitive environment and restrictions on military and civil 
construction budgets had forced it to adapt to these new changes.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Rigsby evaluates this organization to show how the district operates and truly learns in 
order to manage their changes. He concludes: 
It is clearly evident that the elements of the five disciplines of a learning 
organization are present in the Seattle District. But this does not mean that 
the District is now a learning organization.  …Learning organizations 
must always keep learning.  It is about becoming, not being. It is a 
journey, not a destination.75 
For the learning organization concept to be offered as a solution, it would seem 
only right that it be something achievable in order to be successful. Major Abb argues 
that the learning organization is “the key to achieving desired outcomes in all spectrums 
of military operations in the 21st century.”76 
These four “core” disciplines provide even more evidence as to why the military, 
the Army especially, finds the learning organization such an attractive concept.  
However, these disciplines by themselves practiced inconsistently and individually, fall 
short of what could be achieved if they were incorporated systematically.  According to 
Lieutenant Colonel Gerras, 
…although the Army has been at the forefront of instituting processes to 
facilitate organizational learning, at the end of the day the Army is not a 
learning organization, and more importantly, we don’t really understand 
what one looks like or more significantly, how to get there.77 
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Understanding how to get there comes with an understanding of what Senge calls 
the Fifth Discipline, Systems Thinking.  It is this discipline and approach that provides 
the synergy of a learning organization.  “It is the discipline that integrates the others, 
fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice.”78  This shift in focus is the 
cornerstone in understanding how the military can recognize the need for change and 
affect that change to optimize its performance in the ever-changing threat environment.  
But this concept is not yet fully understood or developed within the military as a whole. 
5. The Fifth Discipline- Systems Thinking 
One organization in the military has taken great strides in order to be successful in 
becoming a learning organization.  In the last few years, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) has made both tremendous organizational and process changes to 
remain “relevant, ready, responsive and reliable” in their service.79  They argue that: 
Given the dramatic changes in our national requirements, the dynamic 
shifts in national perspectives, the prominence of knowledge and service 
as the core of today's work, and the vast uncertainties before us - if we can 
only have one skill in the future, then it must be the ability to learn 
effectively and efficiently.80 
The Chief of Engineers has challenged the leaders within the Corps to become 
“rabid advocates of a learning organization”.81 In doing so they have found that this 
requires a change in their culture. However, unlike many who have previously come to 
this conclusion, they understand what this change entails.  Their talking points provide us 
with this insight: “Changing our culture is all about changing our fundamental 
organizational behavior – how we collaboratively do our work.”  At the level at which 
they operate this is the type of systems thinking that is necessary.  They even have 
developed their own learning organization doctrine that takes the ideas of Senge’s 
disciplines, but they have tailored it for their own organization.  In addition they use 
McKinsey’s 7-S systems model of organizations to “focus on the interactions of all 
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organizational parts, and to align all parts with the corporate ideal future design”.82 As 
recently as August 2006, the USACE has implemented its twelve Actions for Change, of 
which eight are focused on effectively implementing a comprehensive systems 
approach.83  
In short, the USACE not only has recognized the need for change within its 
organization but has taken great steps to implement this change.  They have labeled what 
they are doing as becoming a learning organization.  This includes practicing the Five 
Disciplines and taking a comprehensive approach to understanding their role in service to 
the Army and the rest of the world.  This understanding has come from embracing a 
systems approach. 
The first law of systems thinking is: “Today’s problems come from yesterday’s 
solutions.”84  Looking at past solutions critically via systems thinking can illustrate how 
the military’s commitment to past successes could be the source of the resistance to 
change. 
In his book, Learning from Conflict, Downie argues: 
That to explain doctrinal change a theory must account for the dynamic 
relationship involving both the external influences that make doctrinal 
change necessary and a military’s institutional response to those 
influences.85 
He suggests that doctrine can be evidence of change, but he says that it is 
insufficient proof.  According to his definition this change must have resulted from a 
deliberate process that was aimed at improving the organization’s performance.86   He 
found that the Army did not learn or improve its doctrine in either of the 
counterinsurgency cases he examined.  He stresses, as many others have, that due to the 
failure in Vietnam, changes in doctrine should have been expected or at least 
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considered.87  However, there were none.  He does show, however, that there was 
institutional learning in regard to the counter-drug doctrine used by the U.S.. 
To explain the reason why there was learning in some instances but not in others, 
he uses three theories: the Balance of Power Theory (from Posen), Organizational 
Theory, and Institutional Learning Theory; the latter parallels Argyris and Schon’s 
concept of Organizational Learning.  Using the Institutional Learning Theory, he argues 
that a blocked institutional consensus, an incomplete learning cycle, and a creation of 
organizational defenses that prevented learning in the counterinsurgency cases.88  With 
respect to the counter-drug doctrine, the army did learn. Downie suggests that none of 
these theories sufficiently explained the change; rather, it is the relationship between the 
external conditions creating the need for change and the institutional factors that facilitate 
this change.  In short, the explanation requires systems thinking.  According to the 
National Defense University, the Systems paradigm: 
 …should be viewed as a tool that leaders can use to design their 
organization's capability to: (1) analyze tactical and strategic 
environments; (2) develop and enact strategies in response to 
environmental demands; and, (3) sustain an adaptive and productive 
organizational culture.89   
For the military to achieve the flexibility that it desires, it should continue to 
remain focused on its learning capabilities as this concept is still extremely important. 
However, in order to understand how to recognize the need and affect change, the 
systems thinking approach is necessary. 
F. SUMMARY 
The U.S. Army, as a service, claims that the learning organization is the solution 
for coping with its dynamic environment.  But through the iterations discussed, it has 
become bastardized to the point of misuse.  Several Air Force organizations have come to 
the same conclusion.  However, the Navy has remained deeply rooted in tradition with 
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little dialogue as to the learning organization's viability.  It is purpose of this thesis to 
provide a way of thinking that allows the military as a whole to realize the need for 
change sooner.  Peter Senge’s concept of the learning organization could assist in this 
capability. Yet due to its continuous misuse and misconception, it too has become a 
hindrance; merely becoming another obstruction in the quest to understand the 
relationships within the military system. 
It is the purpose of the next two chapters to introduce two frameworks for the 
military, one prescriptive and one theoretical.  These frameworks were created with an 
emphasis on the military as a system and the interactions of each of its subsystems among 
themselves and with their environment.  The focus is not on the military as a learning 
organization, but rather, using the systems approach in order to determine what drives the 
need for change in the military and why there is resistance once a need to change is 
identified. 
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IV. A PRESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE MILITARY 
SYSTEM 
In the midst of day-to-day operations in the bureaucratic jungle, it is helpful to get 
your head above the trees every so often to see where these daily operations are guiding 
the organization.  Systems thinking raises one’s view in just this manner.  Applying this 
concept, in this chapter we translate the literature on military strategy, doctrine, 
organization, technology, and culture as they interact with the each other and the external 
environment to build a prescriptive framework of military subsystems.  This framework 
allows us to see the potential relationships between the strategic, doctrinal, and 
organizational subsystems which the military can influence.  Following that, we discuss 
each component of the system and analyze the relationships between each subsystem.  
Although this framework is not inclusive of every factor affecting military strategy, it 
remains a powerful approach to understanding the components involved in creating 
strategy. 
A. THE PRESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Figure 3.   The Prescriptive Framework of Military Subsystems 
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Figure 3 depicts an open system consisting of several components.  Those 
elements in the blue circle and the technology box represent the components that are in 
the military’s external environment.  Included are elements such as the U.S. political 
system as well as the threat environment.  The military affects the external elements, but 
there are other factors that may have more of an effect than the U.S. military.  In our 
prescriptive framework for military subsystems problems arise from these external 
elements.  Those elements within the ‘existing paradigm’ box are components of the 
military’s internal environment.  These subsystems are affected by the external 
environment, but the military organization generally has the greatest effect.  Culture is an 
emergent product of the military’s internal environment.  The military has the ability to 
affect culture, but as it is an emergent product, cultural change is seen only after changes 
are made in the internal environment.90  The activities of the military’s internal 
environment generate outputs.  The dashed lines represent feedback from one component 
to another.  The arrows indicate direct flow of influence from one component to another.  
Notice some components are directly connected, while some components influence 
others via a third component.  The relationships between components (i.e., arrows and 
dashed lines) were garnered from literature that we will present in the following 
subsections. 
There are three components the military has the ability to change at will: the 
strategic, doctrinal, and organizational subsystems.  “Strategy is a plan for interacting 
with the competitive environment to achieve organizational goals.”91  Military strategy 
deals with the broad scope of how power is used in coordination with other elements of 
statecraft in order to eliminate the threat or solve the problem.  As seen in Figure 3, the 
subsystems that affect military strategy are the external environment, technology, 
doctrine, and organization.  Technology affects the context of how the military 
components interact with the external environment due to the interaction of new 
equipment and operational procedures.92  Technological change may greatly affect 
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military strategy because it can spur a new logic in how to employ the military.  Doctrine 
affects how the military uses its resources to accomplish goals, i.e., how to fight battles.  
It is a set of fundamental principles, authoritative in nature, by which the U.S. military 
guides its actions in support of national objectives.  Changes to doctrine are iterative in 
nature, and require feedback from how the outputs affect the threat environment.  This is 
described by a ‘delay’ notation in the model.  The Organizational subsystem deals 
specifically with the structure and processes of the organization as a whole.  It defines 
how elements within the organization pass information and organize in order to execute 
the strategy.  Organizational change refers to adjustments in the structure and work-flows 
within the organization. 
B. STRATEGY SUBSYSTEM 
It is the role of the United States military to use its resources to contribute to the 
accomplishment of the National Security Strategy (NSS).  On a broad scale, this 
declaration of the grand strategy of the United States presents to the people how the 
President plans to implement the elements of power to achieve a desired end state.  The 
objective never strays far from what President Bush states in the 2006 NSS: “to protect 
the lives and livelihoods” of the American people.93  Without a doubt, the contributing 
factors to the end state certainly vary over time.  Since the NSS presents the ideas of how 
the military is to be used, it is logical that military strategy should be derived from the 
ideas presented in the NSS. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL SUBSYSTEM 
Historically, the military bureaucracy has been effective in creating a force to 
implement military strategy.  Bureaucracies in general provide for “systematic and 
rational ways to organize and manage tasks too complex to be understood and handled by 
a few individuals, thus greatly improving the efficiency and effectiveness of large 
organizations.”94  Henry Mintzberg, a renowned organizational theorist, claims that 
certain organizational types fit to particular environments and contends that a 
bureaucracy is most effective when the environment of the organization is stable and 
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complex.95  A stable environment is one where the variables stay the same over many 
months or years.  Clark Murdock, in his study of the Goldwater-Nichols Act states, 
“Much of the United States’ national security structure was built in an era of predictable, 
relatively static threats.”96  During the Cold War period the relatively stable environment 
allowed for the military to focus on streamlining internal processes without concern for 
sudden change in the external environment. 
In the years since the end of the Cold War, significant changes have occurred in 
the environment due to increased political instability and the advent of the Information 
Age.  These changes have the net effect of increasing the complexity and instability of 
the environmental factors with which the military must contend.  According to 
Mintzberg’s theory, with these types of changes there should be a corresponding change 
in organizational form if the organization is to be effective in dealing with competitors.  
In our model, we show that the external environment’s influence on the organizational 
subsystem is routed via the strategic subsystem. 
Civilian corporations are dealing with the same intensity of change and are 
coming to the “stark realization that the traditional bureaucratic approach is no longer 
suitable to support competitive positioning in this environment.”97  Military leaders and 
advisors also realize that an “organization facing a rapidly changing marketplace and new 
technologies must adapt or risk becoming irrelevant.”98  Unfortunately, the bureaucratic 
organizational form creates a catch-22 situation for military leaders. 
In this unstable environment, bureaucracies have external and internal obstacles to 
contend with in order to operate effectively.  First, the external environment may mutate 
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faster than the internal formalization and standardization of procedures can be adjusted to 
assure a favorable outcome.  Thus the procedures used in yesterday’s wars, i.e., doctrine, 
may hamper efforts to fight the current conflict.  According to Barry Posen, the military 
organization affects the doctrine because “military doctrines are in the day-to day custody 
of military organizations.”99  The military organization has the responsibility for the 
development and execution of the doctrine in peacetime and war, respectively.  
Therefore, the organization “exerts[s] a powerful and distinctive influence on military 
doctrine.”100  As Douglass Macgregor exclaims, “revolutionary advances in war fighting 
will really depend more on organizational change than on technology alone.”101  
Additionally, the current hierarchical structure creates a hierarchical approach to war 
“that currently characterizes U.S. military doctrine.”102 
Second, a characteristic inherent to the bureaucracy is distributed power to 
particular individuals to assure tasks are accomplished.  Posen claims this redistribution 
of limited power makes those empowered unmotivated to change: “Generally, it is not in 
the interests of most of an organization’s members to promote or succumb to radical 
change.”103  Jeffrey Pfeffer, the author of Managing with Power, explains Posen’s claim 
by saying, “Almost any innovation, of either a product or a process, inevitably changes 
power structures.”104  As power is a tightly held commodity, a redistribution of power 
means someone is going to lose power during the change. 
From an organizational standpoint, even if the need to change is detected, the 
structural and individual interests often inhibit the motivation to actually change.  The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies states, “Today we face adaptive, highly-
agile opponents with flexible doctrine, short chains of command, and rapid internal 
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processes.  Coherence and agility are natural enemies, and it is no small trick to make any 
structure the size of the U.S. government either coherent or agile.”105 
D. DOCTRINE SUBSYSTEM 
In our prescriptive framework, strategy, with input from the organization 
subsystem, shapes military doctrine.  In his book on the sources of military doctrine, 
Barry Posen states: 
A military doctrine may harm the security interests of the state if it is not 
integrated with the political objectives of the state’s grand strategy – if it 
fails to provide the statesman with the tools suitable for the pursuit of 
those objectives. A military doctrine may also harm the security interests 
of the state if it fails to respond to changes in political circumstances, 
adversary capabilities, or available military technology – if it is 
insufficiently innovative for the competitive and dynamic environment of 
international politics. If war comes, such a doctrine may lead to defeat.106 
A brief overview of the changes within the political circumstances, adversary 
capabilities, and military technology over the past 20 years would lead one to believe that 
tremendous doctrinal change has occurred within the military.  Contrary to this logic, 
Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor claims that many of the military’s command 
relationships, connectivity between communications nodes, structures for information 
exchange requirements, and associated support equipment is inappropriately lodged in an 
architecture developed in World War II.  He argues, “New missions for today’s military 
establishment that were either unknown or unanticipated fifty years ago make change in 
the command and control structure of today’s World War II-based operational structure 
imperative.”107  He also says that the concept of using new technology within the 
command structure dictated by doctrine limits the potential revolutionary effects of the 
technology.108 
Colonel Macgregor gives insight to the working relationship between doctrine, 
technology, and organization.  From this example, it is clear that the relationship between 
                                                 
105 Clark A. Murdock et al., 13. 
106 Posen, 16. 
107 Douglas A. MacGregor, “Transforming Operational Architecture for the Information Age,” 
(presentation, Tel Aviv University), 2, http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/00jaffemacgregor.pdf, (accessed 
August 8, 2006). 
108 Ibid., 1. 
35 
strategy, doctrine, and organization should be as depicted in Figure 3.  That is, influence 
should flow from the strategy component to the doctrine and organization components; 
doctrine and organization should not be the primary shaping forces on strategy.  
The idea of paradigms may be applied metaphorically to the concept of military 
doctrine.  Doctrine is ingrained in soldiers’ minds and is to be applied in wartime 
situations as taught in peacetime.  Imagine the opportunities that appear when doctrine is 
seen as a leverage point for change rather than a standard operating procedure.  This 
method of looking at the current strategy, which is based on the current environment, 
encourages the military member to enact anticipatory change.  He can then adjust the 
doctrine that won the last war in order to win the current war.  To remain locked in the 
dated, albeit previously successful, doctrine is a recipe for failure. 
E. TECHNOLOGY SUBSYSTEM 
Technology affects the context of how the military components interface with the 
external environment due to the interaction of new equipment and operational 
procedures.109  Although the military has internal units that perform technological 
research to support current doctrine, technology is generally developed outside the 
military’s internal environment. 
As seen from historical examples, technology and doctrine have an interesting 
relationship.  In the American Civil War, “new technologies were …married to old 
concepts of operations.”  As a result, the war became one of attrition rather than one of 
“military genius”.  Dr. John Arquilla contends the Confederate Army could have 
prevailed if it had realized the effect that the technological advances of the industrial age 
had on the offense-defense balance.110  Similarly, Stephen Cimbala states that technology 
should shape doctrine and organization.111  Thus, in our model the flow of influence is 
from technology to doctrine. 
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The magnitude of change in the technology subsystem may be small or classified 
as “shocks”.  Akin to the idea of the complex adaptive system, a small change in the 
technology subsystem may have “dam bursting effects” on doctrine.112  The strategy 
subsystem is updated via a feedback loop from this interface between doctrine and 
technology.  While critical to understand the functionality of technological advances, “it 
is equally important that risks and vulnerabilities—the stuff of strategy—remain foremost 
in assessing their political and military implications.”113 
F. CULTURE SUBSYSTEM 
MIT professor Edgar Schein defines culture as: 
The deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are learned 
responses to the group’s problems of survival in its external environment 
and its problems of internal integration; are shared by members of an 
organization; that operate unconsciously; and that define in a basic “taken-
for-granted” fashion in an organization’s view of itself and its 
environment114 
In our study of the military as an open system, it is interesting that Dr. Schein 
states that culture allows the organization to cope with its internal and external 
environment.  Other organizational theorists state that culture is a by-product of the 
organizational structure, the types of tasks performed, the manner in which the tasks are 
carried out, and the types of people in the organization.115  To clarify, the culture that 
emerges today was created yesterday, and will affect how an organization views its 
environment tomorrow.  Because culture is a result of numerous factors and has an 
“unconscious” aspect, it is very difficult to change it directly or quickly. 
Williamson Murray describes military culture and its role within the organization 
as “the sum of the intellectual, professional, and traditional values of an officer corps; it 
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plays a central role in how the officer corps assesses the external environment and how it 
analyzes the possible response that it might make to the threat.”116  In other words, the 
culture both creates and reinforces the already established mental models within the 
military organization.  In this manner, military culture represents the intellectual capacity 
or the mental models that allow ground, air, and maritime forces to train for and execute 
strategy. 
In our prescriptive framework, we show culture as a by-product of the internal 
environment of the military system.  Based on Dr. Schein’s work, culture is also shown 
as a filter between the military’s external and internal environment. 
G. A BALANCING ACT 
New technologies seem to arrive at a quickening pace, and it is difficult to 
determine which ones will give our side the decisive edge in battle.  Innovations that have 
revolutionary effects on the nature of warfare often are unanticipated and rapid in nature.  
These times of “punctuated equilibrium” are like those instances when the planets align; 
they don’t happen very often, and a number of factors must fall into precise alignment for 
the event to occur.117  In a punctuated equilibrium of the military system, the forces of 
strategy, organization, and doctrine are in harmony with its present external environment. 
Our current environment is driven by the characteristics of the Information Age.  
The technological advances are shaping the methods by which people interact, as well as 
changing the types of people who interact with each other.  “At a macro level, the 
increased interconnections enabled by computers, communication technologies and 
global business networks have created a more complex economic and social 
environment.”118  The combination of political instability and technological advances 
made during the late 1980s and 1990s led to the formation of networked individuals with 
the power to inflict harm on traditional nation-states.  This concept was probably 
laughable twenty-five years ago. 
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Another byproduct of the Information Age is that the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of operation are compressed.  Tactical events may have strategic 
implications, and the ramifications of an ill-chosen tactic loom large.  Field Marshal 
Helmuth Graf von Moltke hints at this influence with, “[t]he demands of strategy grow 
silent in the face of a tactical victory and adapt themselves to the newly created 
situation.”119  The strategic silence may create a political uproar. 
H. SYSTEMS THINKING AS A TOOL TO DEAL WITH COMPLEXITY 
From the analysis of the subsystems covered so far, one aspect remains constant: 
a change in the environment affects the other subsystems.  As illustrated in our 
prescriptive framework, a change that occurs in one of the subsystems has an effect on 
the others.  We have listed just a few examples of where there are many factors changing, 
but the concept of the relationships between the military subsystems remains stagnant 
within the leaders’ minds.  The question remains: Why don’t leaders entertain changing 
these relational concepts just as eagerly as they embrace new technologies?  Systems 
thinking should force leaders to raise their level of analysis and enables them to better 
understand relationships between the components within the military system. 
There are a number of reasons why the military needs different methods to 
categorize its environment.  The most obvious reason is that the military needs to make 
decisions that mitigate unintended effects.  In the Information Age, the lines between the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are blurred; the traditional ways of 
defeating the enemy may have unexpected and profound effects.120  In the past 60 years, 
the United States has been involved in many more unconventional wars than 
conventional.  It is crucial for the U.S. military to be more flexible in applying resources 
to defeat enemies who act without the constraints of conventional warfare.  Today’s 
military organizations need to view change as a learning process and a necessity instead 
of a threat to a long-standing and successful “institution.”  By unreasonably protecting 
aspects of its internal environment without analysis of the ordered effects of doing so, the 
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military imposes constraints on itself which makes it ineffective in critical situations.121  
Doctrine is a perfect example of a constraint.  War planners tend to treat doctrine shaped 
by the last war as a paradigm for action until it has failed in the current war.  In fact, 
Barry Posen finds that the need to change within military organizations stems from one of 
two occurrences: military defeat and civilian intervention.122  Since the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has in effect lessened civilian influence on the military, one hopes that the 
military can learn on its own rather than suffer defeat.123 
Systems thinking will enable the military to identify those barriers within the 
organization – the barriers in which the military has actual control over – that inhibit its 
ability to achieve national objectives. 
What is at issue is not whether or not change should occur. Ultimately 
there is no effective barrier to change. There are, however, numerous 
barriers to effective change. The distinction is in the final outcome. 
Organizations in general and military forces in particular either emerge 
stronger and more capable of performing their mission, or they are 
defeated and replaced.124 
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V. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MILITARY 
SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Literature . . . often portrays . . . change like a brisk march along a well-
marked path, while those in the middle . . . are more likely to describe 
their journey as a laborious crawl toward an elusive, flickering goal, with 
many wrong turns and missed opportunities along the way.125 
        -Todd Jick 
Today, military professionals and politicians agree that the threats facing the U.S. 
Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, while prosecuting the GWOT, are distinctly different than 
the threats that the U.S. military is prepared to fight.126  Similarly, in 1976, the U.S. 
Army's Special Warfare Center conducted a study that concluded that “nearly every 
analyst and political and military leader agreed that pacification was the key requirement 
for building a viable national government and defeating the insurgency” in Vietnam.127  
In other words, the majority of our national decision makers agreed that the Vietnam 
strategy had to focus on the population rather than the military forces of North Vietnam, 
yet this strategy was not adopted.  This leaves one to believe that the current military 
organization's asymmetry with today's threat environment is not all together new. 
A generation has passed since the Vietnam War and the U.S. military system 
continues to be unable to effectively execute a viable strategy.  How is it that the U.S. 
military continues to disregard alternative strategies?  Looking at the military system and 
its subsystems, using the principles of systems thinking, provides an answer to this 
question.  As Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor wrote in his most recent book, 
Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights, “For [A]rmy 
transformation to be progressive...a clear connection between strategy, structure, 
readiness, thinking, technology, and transformation must exist.”128 
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The subsystems of strategy, doctrine (thinking), organizational force structure, 
threat environment, and technology become the most prominent variables when looking 
at the military organization using systems thinking.  A significant discovery is that the 
flow of information between the subsystems is either restricted or seriously distorted in 
today’s military organization.  This distortion causes a less than optimal relationship 
between the subsystems.  We call these distortions inhibitors to proper information flow 
within the military system.  The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical 
framework, identify inhibitors within the framework, and discuss how these inhibitors 
affect the relationships between the different subsystems operating within the military 
system.  Again, we do not claim this to be an exhaustive list of all the variables that 
contribute to the functioning of the military organization.  However, we do wish to 
narrow the analysis to specific variables that possibly have the most impact and from 
which agents of change may find the most leverage. 
The theoretical framework of the military system shows how the military system 
actually works and reasons for its sub-standard performance.  The first section introduces 
a framework of the military system of systems describing the causal relationships 
between the threat environment, technology, strategy, doctrine, and organizational force 
structure.  The remaining sections focus on the specific inhibitors and how they relate to 
the various subsystems.  The final section addresses the issue of defining culture as either 
the problem or the solution to change upon which academics, politicians, and military 
professionals focus too much attention. 
The larger purpose of this chapter is not to suggest answers or solutions, but to 
offer an intelligent discussion of how military organizations change and what may cause 
the changes. By using systems thinking basics and simply identifying how the system and 
its subsystems interrelate, we may begin to understand the leverage points for change and 
how to move our military beyond the 21st century and current processes. 
B. THE FRAMEWORK 
Why is the premier fighting force in the world, the U.S. military, losing control 
and influence in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters after initial historic success?  We argue 
it is because the U.S. military's system of operation is handicapped by several inhibitors.   
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In order to identify and understand these inhibitors and where they are located, we 
must look at the military as a complete and open system, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   The Theoretical Framework of the Military System 
 
A quick study of this framework brings to light two major differences between the 
prescriptive and theoretical frames.  The first difference is created by the doctrine and 
organizational force structure that dictate the capabilities and strategy the military 
organization is likely to favor.  This phenomenon, depicted in Figure 4, causes the 
doctrine and organization to influence the strategy rather than the strategy influencing the 
doctrine and organization. This effect is caused by the rigidity of military doctrine and 
the legacy of organizational force structure.  The second difference is the presence of a 
paradigm filter that is a product of doctrine.  Military leadership, analysts, and strategic 
planners analyze and define the threat environment in terms of the doctrine that they are 
prepared to implement. 
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The two major inhibitors to the military change process are the organization's 
rigidity of doctrine and its stalwart commitment to the current organizational structure.  
These two distortions change doctrine and structure from being dependent on strategic 
plans focused on the threat environment to becoming fixtures that define the military 
organization, independent of the threat environment.  This rigidity produces an inability 
for the organization to craft a viable strategy when the threat environment and the system 
are not most favorably matched.  Additionally, this rigidity of the doctrine has, in 
practice, created a “paradigm filter” that influences not only how the military 
organization defines the threat, but also, the organization's strategic interaction with the 
threat environment. 
In order to develop an optimal strategy, military doctrine and organizational force 
structure have got to become dependent on the strategic plan.  Anthony H. Cordesman 
states, “Any ‘new way of war’ is built solidly on the past and the proper mix of new and 
old capabilities.”129  On the contrary, a “new way of war,” must focus on the threat 
environment and be built “solidly” on a viable counter-threat strategy.  Rather than the 
military's primary role being to fight and win our nation's wars, the military's role should 
be focused on fighting and successfully countering national threats which include both 
non-state and state actors.  Therefore, the military organization must be prepared to 
develop and execute a strategy focused on the threat, rather than, go to war with the 
military, its doctrine and force structure that they have.130 
C. THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
If you were to try and place a frog into a pot of boiling water, as you would 
expect, it will immediately jump out.  However, if the frog is placed in room temperature 
water that is gradually brought to a boil, then the frog will not jump out of the pot.  Like 
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the frog, only after a sudden change in its environment will an organization, “sense” the 
need to change.131  However, the organization must realize, before the environment 
becomes fatal, that the water in which it finds itself is changing.  The threat environment, 
whether defined as a national force, a terrorist network, or an ideology, creates problems 
for the military organization.  In this section, we address the absence, misinterpretations, 
or existence of external stimuli and their effects on the change process. 
The absence of an external stimulus, either political or situational, makes change 
within a military organization less likely.  For example, Geoffrey L. Herrera and Thomas 
G. Mahnken show that after the Napoleonic Wars, the British Army did not transform as 
the continental armies did in Prussia, Austria, and Russia because they saw no need to 
alter their composition and because they “had not suffered a traumatic defeat at the hands 
of the French.”132  Therefore, Britain was Napoleon's only adversary that did not depart 
from its long-established method of ground combat after the Napoleonic Wars.  This 
found the British infantry “ill-trained, ill-equipped, and ill-prepared” for deployment on 
the continent prior to WWII.133 
Another point of view, but just as disturbing, is that organizations do not 
recognize failure, but focus mainly on success.  Today, the military does not see a need to 
change after it achieved success in historical proportions during Desert Storm.  The U.S. 
military is struggling to adjust doctrine, structure, and strategy after the current doctrine, 
AirLand Battle Doctrine, achieved unprecedented dominance during Desert Storm.  The 
enemies of the United States have learned from Desert Storm that the military continues 
to view unconventional warfare as a lesser form of conflict rather than a viable strategy 
worthy of extensive change and implementation.  “The [d]efense [e]stablishment as a 
whole still operates under the implicit assumption that “low-intensity” warfare is merely  
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a lesser-included case of ‘real’ war.”134  The result is an unwillingness to accept that the 
vast majority of state and non-state actors are not inclined to engage the U.S. military in a 
conventional conflict. 
Correspondingly, the military organization will confidently validate the 
superiority of its doctrinal and strategic thought if its leadership suitably redefines its 
failures as “anomalies” or “unique situations.”  General Gordon Sullivan, in his analysis 
of Army Transformation, quotes Arie de Gues of Royal Dutch Shell, who said that it is 
key for leadership “to recognize and react to environment change before the pain of a 
crisis.”  Sullivan argues that this is very difficult.  “Without a perceptible crisis to 
galvanize people to action, there is enormous resistance to change.”135  Therefore, the 
absence of a crisis creates a perception of success within the military organization.  This 
perception can lead to an unhealthy evaluation of the organization’s capabilities and 
ability to withstand environmental change, making it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to change a successful organization. 
The mere existence of detrimental stimuli does not guarantee appropriate change, 
either.  After 9/11, the external stimulus was painfully apparent.  During Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the external stimulus that created overwhelming success was the 
political demand for the military to “act quickly.”  The political will and public pressure 
were too great for any reaction less than an immediate response.  Because of the nation’s 
impetus to act quickly, the United States Special Operations Command was the only 
organization capable of getting boots on the ground, in short order.  Therefore, the 
President, through the Department of Defense, ordered a handful of Special Operations 
Forces from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to work “by, with, and through” the Afghanistan 
Northern Alliance.  There is no doubt that “the war in Afghanistan demonstrated the 
power of U.S. unconventional warfare capabilities when merged with standoff 
conventional capabilities, such as precision air power.”136  Once the 10th Mountain 
Division accepted command responsibility in Afghanistan, a conventional strategy began 
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to permeate the battle space.  It has taken the U.S. military four years and an additional 
limited war in Iraq to begin to think about altering the strategic course in both theaters.  
Unconventional strategy is beginning to find space in the conventional military's thinking 
with the creation of the Irregular Warfare Joint Operations Concept. However, the 
adoption and execution of this type of strategy is far more complex than the collaboration 
and writing of a joint concept. 
It is not enough to identify the threat, as organizations must also understand the 
nature of the threat in order to defeat it.  Current military doctrine focuses on mass and 
firepower to attrit the enemy's forces.  In the GWOT, Macgregor recognizes that there is 
a different threat environment, but he does not understand the nature of the insurgent 
threat. The insurgent possesses the information advantage and, therefore, maintains the 
initiative and decides to attack when most advantageous to his cause.137  Therefore, the 
task of forcing the insurgent to battle is problematic.  Macgregor suggests  
To distinguish a determined enemy such as al-Qaeda from the civilian 
populace in complex and urban terrain and bring them to battle, army 
combat units must be capable of encountering an enemy on the ground and 
compelling it to react.138 
However, the insurgents are not forced to battle.  They control their casualty rate 
and, therefore, do not commit to battle unless the odds are on their side.  The non-state 
actor or “counter-state” has the luxury of winning by not losing, while the state must win 
to not lose.139  This is the nature of the current threat environment in terms of the GWOT. 
After the Cold War, the military executed a successful force shift from threat-
based to capability based.  This inward focus currently shifts attention from the threat 
environment which, in turn, prohibits the system from achieving optimal performance.  
Only when the external stimulus, the threat, is identified, can its weaknesses be 
discovered and then systematically exploited through a proper strategy.  As Colonel 
Robert Killebrew notes in his recent Armed Forces Journal article, “Why Doctrine 
Matters and How To Fix It,” the U.S. Army is beginning to discover that “capability 
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based requirements are hollow.”140    A capability focused organization becomes less 
effective because it attempts to focus on several capabilities simultaneously.  This broad 
focus fosters a “Jack of all trades, master of none” approach that is ultimately ineffective. 
D. TECHNOLOGY 
 
Knowing what the army does in war helps scientists and engineers with an 
eye on technology understand what the army needs to be successful in 
combat.141   
-Colonel Douglas Macgregor   
 
Technology or technical systems, as organizational theorists define it, affects the 
context of how the military components interact with the environment due to the 
implementation of new equipment and operational procedures.142 Technological change 
greatly affects military strategy because it spurs a new logic in how to employ the 
military.  However, if the technology is unable to deliver successfully its anticipated 
capabilities, then it can create a sense of uncertainty within the organization.  Technology 
can impede the development of doctrine while facilitating structural change. 
Technologies may be unable to deliver the foreseen applications, creating 
uncertainty within the leadership about the utility of the new technological advancement.  
The limitation of the new technology can adversely affect the development of doctrines 
when the technology is less mature.  “Technology-led military change may be hampered 
not so much by military conservatism as by the technology itself.”143  Chris Demchak 
claims that the U.S. military's high aspiration for revolutionary change in information 
systems may not be obtainable with today's technologies.  Organizational leaders and 
operators thus may perceive that technologies have an adverse effect on the current 
command structure or operational practices of a presumably efficient and effective 
military.  Such a perception may lead the military to disregard the possible quantum leaps 
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in advantages gained over their adversary because of fear of losing what they know and 
are comfortable with.144  The issue is simply whether, as technologies mature, does the 
military organization recognize the necessary organizational and doctrinal changes that 
are required in order to exploit the technological advantages?  The current struggles of 
Information Operations in the military organization are a prime example. 
James Q. Wilson, in his book Bureaucracy, addresses the relationship between 
technology and doctrine.  “Organizations will readily accept inventions that facilitate the 
performance of existing tasks.”145 That is to say, scientists rely on doctrine to guide the 
path and goals of technological advancements.  Thus, Military doctrine dictates the 
technology that will be developed.  For this reason, not all technologies are accepted.  
According to Wilson, “some technological advancements are resisted for varying degrees 
because their use changes operator tasks and managerial controls.”146  Not only does 
doctrine affect technology, but once investments are made in technological 
advancements, it is extremely difficult for doctrine to change.  Once abundant time and 
resources are used to develop and integrate a technological advancement into the military 
system, the path dependence of the technology, in essence, locks the military 
organization into a doctrine and strategy that are constrained by the available 
technologies.  Furthermore, as the military organization becomes more dependent on 
technology, the technology begins to define the tasks.  As Wilson points out, in Vietnam, 
“tasks were defined more by available technology...than by a clear understanding of what 
kinds of tasks were appropriate to the conditions of war in Vietnam.”147 
Macgregor addresses the importance of structure to the adoption of new 
technologies; he states that “a willingness to change direction in force [structure] is very 
important to the success of the army's future combat system [FSC] program.  FCS 
development cannot be pursued in isolation from organizational change.”148  Once a 
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technological advance is accepted by the military organization, the structure is then able 
to adjust.  For example, as communication and information technology improve, 
dispersed units will become more lethal and less vulnerable.  This was the case in World 
War II with the invention and fielding of the two-way radios in maneuver formations and 
possibly with the potential adoption of BattleSwarm Doctrine as information technologies 
become even more reliable.149  
E. STRATEGY 
According to the prescriptive framework, the organization must identify and 
understand the threat, then develop a strategy, adjust/create doctrine and organize itself to 
properly execute the strategy.  In other words, once a strategy is devised, military 
tacticians must formulate doctrine based on the strategy and available technology.  
However, as seen in Figure 4, this is not the case.  On the contrary, the strategy that the 
military decides to employ is based on the current doctrine, available technology, current 
force structure, and the inherent political pressures associated with said strategy.  In this 
section, we discuss strategy’s dependence on doctrine due to the military organization's 
understanding of strategy, how political risks have a perverse effect on implementing a 
strategy, and how the Information Age does not make the decision any easier. 
In the U.S. military organization, strategy is dependent on doctrine.  This 
statement becomes more apparent after further examination of two separate definitions of 
strategy.  B.H. Liddell Hart in his book, Strategy, discusses the differences between 
Clausewitz's definition of strategy and German World War II General H. von Moltke's 
definition.  Clausewitz understands strategy as “the art of employment of battles as a 
means to gain the object of war.”150  This is the definition that the U.S. military is more 
likely to adopt.  However, according to Hart, the main fault with this definition is that it 
allows the reader to “reach the conclusion that in war every other consideration should be 
subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive battle.”151  This definition of strategy while 
elevating the prerequisite of battle may inadvertently downplay the importance of 
political   context.  On the other hand, Moltke's definition of strategy; “the practical 
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adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object in 
view,”152 links the general to the government that he is serving, thereby acknowledging 
the importance of political influence and advice.  The U.S. military organization seems to 
be partial to Clausewitz's definition of strategy; intently focused on the decisive battle or 
“center of gravity” at the expense of other strategies that may focus more heavily on 
political context and its relative importance. 
Not surprisingly, conventional doctrine is continuing to dominate strategic 
thinking during the GWOT.  The U.S. military organization continues to develop its 
strategy based on a doctrine focused on winning the decisive battle.  This is evident when 
studying Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  According to Lieutenant General Scott 
Wallace, 5th Corp Commander in Iraq, the war would be over once the decisive battle at 
the international airport was won.  “For nearly a year, we had recognized collectively that 
once we were through the Karbala Gap, the fight would not be over until we seized the 
international airport in Baghdad.”153  However, the fight was not over in Baghdad in 
2003 and continues to this day.  Once the Saddam statue fell, the true fight for Baghdad 
had just begun even though the decisive battle for the Baghdad International Airport 
ended with a positive outcome.   
In Iraq, the environment had changed but the strategy had not.  Military 
commanders, collectively, had failed to identify the change in the environment and 
continued to execute a strategy that was ill suited to the environment and stood idly by as 
the control of the population slipped through their collective fingertips.  As the U.S. 
doctrine suggests, a strategist must focus on securing key terrain, such as bridges and 
airports during a conventional conflict.  This strategic focus based on a conventional 
conflict caused military leaders to underestimate the importance of controlling the local 
population centers during the combat phase.  Instead, they treated the population centers 
as an afterthought: a task to be completed once the fighting was complete.  As Lieutenant 
General Wallace stated, “We never had any intention of fighting in those southern cities, 
because we felt that would put us at a disadvantage; so we intended to bypass them.”154  
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However, once faced with strong opposition, the 5th Corps was able to suppress the 
population centers that they “anticipated addressing later, in Phase 4 stability 
operations.”155  The strategy was driven by the doctrine rather than the threat.  As the 
environment changed during OIF, military commanders had trouble adapting the strategy 
accordingly, or they simply did not understand the threat. 
Not only is the strategy driven by the doctrine, but it is also implemented in order 
to justify the doctrine to some degree.  During both World War II and Vietnam, the 
strategy was driven by the need to support the doctrine of strategic bombing.  According 
to Bartiz, during Vietnam, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) strategic bombing doctrine dictated 
the USAF strategy. 
The huge B-52s were wheeled out because they were at the center of the 
air force's most important function, strategic bombing of the USSR.  If the 
air force had not been allowed to use these machines, it feared that its 
strategic-bombing role might be down graded after the war.156   
As Murray and Millet have stated, the “measure of air effectiveness thus became 
the number of tons dropped, sorties flown, and acres of cities damaged or destroyed; air 
war became an end in itself.”157  In essence, operations became the measures of 
effectiveness by which particular strategies were justified regardless of their impact or the 
nature of the conflict. 
Political risk, which establishes a political priority by national decision makers, 
also has a perverse effect on strategic decision making.  If a high level of political risk is 
present with increased priority, then the national government will allocate more than 
sufficient resources in order to solve the problem.  With additional resources the military 
leadership is less willing to deviate from a strategy based on overwhelming force; 
regardless of the threat.  Conversely, if there is perceived lower political risk, less 
political oversight and fewer resources are allocated to the problem.  With fewer 
resources, the military leadership is required to entertain alternate strategies.  Few 
Americans remember the success of U.S. strategy in El Salvador during the 1980s while 
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national leadership was focused on the Soviet Union and Europe.  Today we only have to 
compare and contrast the effectiveness of current U.S. military strategies in Iraq with the 
effectiveness of the U.S. military strategy in the Philippines to understand the 
manifestation of this relationship between political risk, governmental priority, and the 
willingness to implement alternative strategies based on the number of resources 
allocated by the national government.158 
With the political and conventional military focus squarely on the GWOT theaters 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has the freedom or constraint, depending on the 
point of view, to execute an unarguably successful counterinsurgency strategy in the 
southern Philippine archipelago which began in February 2002 and continues today.  The 
strategy, executed by 160 U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) advisors, began on the Island of 
Basilan, the stronghold of Al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf.  
Thereafter, its success has spread into other terrorist sanctuaries.  The strategy focuses on 
the SF advisors working “by, with, and through” the indigenous security forces using a 
holistic approach focused on local security and governmental assistance to the population 
in order to increase governmental legitimacy.  According to Greg Wilson, who quotes a 
Pilipino battalion commander, “where once the people supported rebels and extremists 
because they felt neglected...the delivery of their basic needs...changed their attitudes and 
loyalty.”159  The questions that the governmental strategist must ask are whether or not 
the threat environment in the Philippines is similar to that found in the theaters of Iraq 
and Afghanistan? And if so, would our national leadership have the liberty to implement 
a similarly holistic strategy when the political risks associated with OIF are so high? 
F. DOCTRINE 
1. Doctrinal Rigidity 
 Innovations in military doctrine will be rare because they increase 
operational uncertainty.160 
       -Barry R. Posen 
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Retired General Gordon Sullivan wrote in his book, Hope is Not a Method, that 
“doctrine is the engine of change.”161  This implies that strategy and organizational 
structure do not change unless doctrine changes. We explain the prescribed relationship 
between doctrine, strategy, and structure as one where strategy is the driving force of 
change rather than doctrine and doctrinal rigidity, in and of itself, is one explanation for 
why this relationship is altered in reality. 
James Q. Wilson explains the evolution of Army doctrine from 1958 to 1988, 
from the “pentomic” division to AirLand Battle doctrine.  After the divisional structure of 
World War II, the Army decided on smaller battle groups in order to counter the 
devastating effects of atomic weapons on massed troop formations.  This new structure 
was known as the “pentomic” division.  Then, the army restructured to the 
Reorganization Objectives Army Division (a.k.a. ROAD), back to the three brigade 
(regiment) structure. In the 1970s, after Vietnam, the Army adopted the Active Defense 
as its doctrine and, ten years later, changed once again to the AirLand Battle doctrine, 
which is a divisional structure.162  Even though the doctrine and structure changed four 
times in fifty-eight years, Kevin Sheehan argues that very little changed at all with 
respect to army doctrinal focus.  According to Sheehan, “the [U.S.] Army limited its 
innovations to thinking about better ways to counter a Soviet invasion of Western 
Europe.”163 But during the last fifty-eight years, the U.S. Army has fought in Korea, 
Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan.  None of these wars produced the same “degree of rethinking and 
experimentation” that is encouraged by possible conflict in Europe and mainland 
China.164 
Therefore, the core of U.S. Army doctrine has arguably remained the same since 
World War II: to fight and win in the open plains of Europe, the open deserts of the 
Middle East, or the open steppes of China.  It is spine-tingling to think that the U.S. 
Army has remained the same doctrinally while our threat environment has evolved and 
                                                 
161 Sullivan and Harper, 10. 
162 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 219. 
163 Ibid., 220. 
164 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy. 
55 
adapted over the last three or more generations.  “To a certain extent this rigidity reflects 
an inability and unwillingness to recognize not only that their opponent possessed 
alternative options and conceptions, but that he might exercise those options.”165  During 
Vietnam, “the initial doctrinal emphasis clearly came from having the tasks and structure 
of the army determined by the need to defend Western Europe and to do so by deploying 
heavy firepower and advanced technologies that would minimize human losses.”166 
Additionally, institutional biases against feedback that challenges current doctrine 
or closely held concepts of war enhance this rigidity of doctrine within military 
institutions. According to Murray and Millet, “there was no need for feedback loops to 
learn ‘lessons’ from either exercises or combat” when high command has all the answers. 
167 As Murray and Millet discover in their analysis of doctrine, “such rigidity leads 
organizations to shut off alternative paths that might have eased the way for military 
operations.”168 
Nonetheless, the U.S. military seems to be making efforts to overcome doctrinal 
rigidity.  During OIF, the U.S. military, at the Joint Task Force level, has developed the 
Counter Insurgency Academy in Baghdad169 with the goal of diffusing battlefield 
experience in theater. The jury is still out on the effectiveness of the change, but arguably 
it is a step in the right direction. 
One of the many benefits of doctrine is that it creates organizational paradigms 
that are instrumental in providing the individuals within the organization with mental 
models while attempting to solve given problems.  Jeff Conklin has explained Thomas 
Kuhn's paradigm as a “cognitive foundation on which attitudes, beliefs, and concepts 
come and go. . . Sensory systems are designed to measure change.  If a belief or sensation 
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is constant, then you can expect it to become invisible over time.”170  During Vietnam, 
the military underestimated the number of enemy they were fighting due to their doctrinal 
biases.  According to Loren Baritz, “the military command in Saigon was fixated on 
conventional, big-unit war, and therefore concentrated on the enemy's units that could 
engage the Americans in the sort of war the Americans wished to fight.”171  This 
“fixation” on conventional conflict and enemy military formations caused the “American 
military [to be] deaf and blind to the insurgency.”172  They concentrated on the 
conventional North Vietnamese forces and “wished” the insurgency away. 
Additionally, these mental models function as filters through which the U.S. 
military organization interprets, defines, and predicts changes in the threat environment.  
They cause the organization to overlook, ignore, or blatantly disregard stimuli; thus, 
disregarding alternative strategies that are better suited to neutralize a given threat.   
According to Wilson, “a strong sense of mission may blind the organization to changed 
environmental circumstances so that new opportunities and challenges are met with 
routinized rather than adaptive behavior.”173  In other words, the leadership interprets the 
threat environment based on what they want to see rather than what is actually there. This 
creates bias against feedback that contradicts doctrine or closely held concepts of war.  
The problem with these biases are that they create instability within the change process 
and manifests dysfunctional relationships between the components.  The U.S. Army 
continues to fight “a war of its own choosing instead of the war that [is] going on.”174 
2. Misuse of History 
History is at best an imperfect guide to the future, but when imperfectly 
understood and interpreted it is a menace to sound judgment.175 
       -Bernard Brodie 
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A problem within military organizations that resist change is that they either 
misuse history or blatantly disregard it.  The U.S. military organization has a problem of 
recognizing its history for what it is and then interpreting it through their doctrinal biases.  
There are many historians that proclaim that “Generals prepare for the last war and that is 
why military organizations have a difficult time in the next conflict.”176  However, 
Murray and Millet argue that “most armies do nothing of the kind, and because they have 
not distilled the lessons of the last war, they end up repeating most of the same 
mistakes.”177  Rather than prepare for the last war, military organizations “quickly 
develop myths that allow escape from unpleasant truths.”178  The organization 
continually makes the same mistakes that past generations have painfully experienced. 
As noted in the previous section, the U.S. Army has had a checkered history in 
Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan while focusing on the AirLand Battle 
Doctrine.  For the most part, the U.S. military leadership has drawn too many favorable 
conclusions from their indisputable success during Operation Desert Storm.  According 
to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “[while] it is indisputable that the AirLand Battle 
doctrine was executed well in the Gulf, too much can be read into the outcome of this 
conflict.  [Desert Storm] was not a particularly tough test for U.S. military doctrine.”179 
During Vietnam, General Westmorland wrongly perceived the insurgency as a 
“war of movement” and inaccurately also classified the American Civil War as such, 
attempting to draw similarities between the two.  This inaccurate use of history along 
with a misconception of insurgency doctrine caused the U.S. military to depend heavily 
on “movement to contact” as their primary scheme of maneuver. 
The concept behind “movement to contact” as a tactic is that it allows the enemy 
forces to initiate contact with the U.S. patrols, thereby identifying the enemy’s strength 
and disposition.  The U.S. patrol then requests support.  These arriving additional forces 
allow the initial element, if it continues to exist, to counter punch and attempt to destroy 
the enemy force in detail; however, this tactic has many flaws when executed in an 
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unconventional conflict.  First, the enemy has the initiative; they can decide time and 
place of the engagement.  Second, the enemy has the option to disengage or break contact 
with the U.S. patrol before reinforcements arrive, thus controlling their casualty rate and 
maintaining the initiative.  According to Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., 
...as long as the government forces are out seeking battle with the guerrilla 
units, the insurgents are not forced to fight to maintain access to the 
people.  Therefore, the initiative remains with the guerrillas,-they can 'set' 
their own level of casualties (probably just enough to keep the government 
forces out seeking the elusive big battles), thus rendering ineffective all 
efforts by the counterinsurgent forces to win a traditional military 
victory.180 
The tragedy is that the U.S. Army in the last thirty years has not learned from 
these mistakes.  As this thesis is written similar tactics, such as, movement to contact and 
armed reconnaissance, continue to be employed in Afghanistan with extremely limited 
results.  In the words of Dr. John Arquilla, “military organizations have a selective 
pillage of history.”181  Fortunately, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May in their book, 
Thinking in Time, have given decision makers conceptual tools in order to critically 
evaluate history and its value to making sound decisions.182 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL SUBSYSTEM 
The study of the organizational subsystem and how it affects the military system 
needs to take into consideration the structure and the processes within this component. 
Together, the legacy structure of the military and service dominance impair the 
relationship of the components within the system. Processes within the organizational 
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1. Organizational Structure 
a. Legacy Structure of the Military 
The U.S. Army is designing itself to do what it wants to do, not what the 
new strategic environment is demanding of it.183    
      -Colonel Douglas Macgregor 
According to Douglas A. Macgregor, there are no proposals since the 
beginning of Desert Storm designed to “challenge” the Cold War ten-division structure 
that is “deeply rooted in World War II.”184  The Objective Force of 2015, according to 
Macgregor, “boils down to . . . the current army organization and concepts with 
technologically more advanced equipment.”185 Even though the U.S. Army leadership 
acknowledges that the threat environment is changing, it has yet to shift focus toward 
alternative organizational structures.  Macgregor suggests that “throwing masses of men, 
firepower, and material at even unconventional enemies does not compensate for an army 
structure and an American way of war that is a poor fit in the world that emerged after 
World War II.”186  Yet this structure remains the army's solution to the problem. 
Today in Iraq, as was the case in Vietnam, “the pattern of the way we 
fought is unmistakable:  When something failed to work, we did more of it.”187 The 
recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed the increase of Special Operations 
Forces188, the U.S. Army is increasing its divisions by over 25%, adding one brigade to 
each division,189 and over 20,000 additional troops are deploying to Iraq this year.  These 
additional resources will be inserted into an existing structure that is suited to follow 
conventional doctrine and execute conventional strategy. 
General George Casey recently commented that he understood how his 
recently confirmed successor in Iraq, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, “could want the 
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full complement of 21,500 additional troops that Bush has ordered to Iraq. Casey said 
they could ‘reinforce success, maintain momentum, or put more forces in a place where 
the plans are not working.’”190  If the plans are not working in the first place, it is 
uncertain that dedicating more resources to the plans will bring success in Iraq.  In this 
case, the structure, doctrine, and strategy should be analyzed to optimize the additional 
resources. 
An unhealthy commitment to combat equipment within the structure also 
affects the flexibility of doctrine.  “A great deal of research is being done to try to allow 
the main battle tank to survive hits.”191  According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, the U.S. 
Army's commitment to armor “resembles the earlier - and ultimately futile - effort to 
extend the useful life of the battleship by armoring it ever more heavily.”  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt suggest that “current defense policy analysis should turn, instead, to considering 
what alternative force structures are possible.”192  While the existence of legacy 
equipment provides little assurance of a failure to adapt, the development and support for 
alternative structures could stimulate the adaptation of different strategy. 
b. Service Dominance 
The insular effect on service members, along with an unhealthy 
competition, creates service parochialism within the military.  Academics, military 
officers, and governmental officials have written extensively about the detrimental effects 
of service parochialism since the 1950s, yet little has changed within the military 
organization.  Service chiefs and proponents focused on self interest rather than national 
interest continue to fight for their mandates and assigned tasks by exercising power and 
influence within the established organizational structure.193  Service separatism within 
the Pentagon has been recorded ad infinitum along with receiving the blame for several 
tragic incidents in U.S. military history (e.g. the Pueblo and Mayaquez incidents, Iran 
hostage rescue, and Vietnam); therefore, we will not discuss the incidents’ many 
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intricacies in this section.194  However, because service parochialism is a powerful force, 
we will briefly discuss how it acts as an inhibitor and how parochialism affects strategy, 
as well as the limited advantages of parochialism. 
The military organization can not change doctrine as it relates to a 
counter-threat strategy without addressing service dominance within the military 
organization.  “Jointness will have to broaden and deepen and be seriously regarded by 
all as a necessary condition for the rise of a doctrine that would seek to integrate both the 
data gathering and the fire capabilities of all the services.”195 
This service dominance had a huge impact on the strategy executed during 
Vietnam.  During the Vietnam conflict every service needed a piece of the battle space in 
order to compete in the after war budget and shaping of the military.  “To ensure that 
each service received the credit it deserved, Vietnam was carved into separate preserves, 
called route packages, each owned by a different service.”196  Dr. Kissinger, describing 
this “crazy quilt of geography and command,” said that it showed “that the [Pentagon’s] 
organizational requirements overrode strategy.”197 No service wanted out, even it was 
inefficient and ineffective to execute a strategy of total inclusion of all services.  “The Air 
Force planned for short wars, while the army planned for long ones.” “Interservice 
rivalries, competitive scratching for a bigger slice of the budget, run long and deep in the 
United States.”  A similarly service “inclusiveness” hampered the military strategy in 
Grenada in 1983198 and not much has changed in Afghanistan or Iraq.  Navy Seal 
Platoons are found in both theaters, but water is not.  Naval aircraft are flying sorties in 
both theaters with mixed results.  For example, during a six month deployment to the 
Gulf, aircraft from the USS Carl Vinson flew 9,520 sorties and dropped a total of four 
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bombs in support of Allied Forces in Iraq in 2005.199  Lessons learned and combat 
experience are justifications for the services to engage in what looks like Dr. Arquilla's 
“BattleSwarm”200 doctrine, not in execution of strategy, but in the service struggle for 
limited resources within the Pentagon. 
Service dominance within the organizational structure also has an effect 
on technological advancement.  Service dominance potentially squanders opportunity to 
excel as a military organization.  Admiral William Owens, in his contribution to “The 
Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, and Technology.” makes this point 
painfully apparent.  He describes military organizations as currently not “able to harness 
the full potential of the application of information technology, because [of] its historically 
service-centric nature.”201 
The potential advantages that might be realized by working together to 
create a ‘system of systems’ for changing joint warfare . . . are lost due to 
the fragmented, almost piecemeal nature of which information technology 
is being developed and applied.202  
In contrast, David Tucker has written on the benefits of parochialism 
within the interagency which may be applicable in military organization.  He reminds us 
that each organization has a mandate to defend and accomplish particular tasks.  His view 
is if we condemn this competition or turf war, then “we are saying in effect that one or 
more of these mandates or interests represented by the agency is not worth defending.”203  
According to Tucker, parochialism is a necessary evil, if we are willing to maintain 
different abilities and attitudes.  This is true; in a military organization different abilities 
are necessary and essential. But the organizations should either share the same attitudes 
and ultimate purpose or realize their “niche” and not infringe on the “niche” of others. 
Overall, the net effect of the military organization's “service centric” 
structure deters the organization from efficiently realizing its matured capability.  Joint 
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organizations must be stressed and rewarded within the military organization in order to 
overcome the service dominance that has existed since the entrée of the military.  If this 
is not possible, then joint is not the answer and an alternative solution is to make each 
service more mission specific, redefining their niche. 
2. Organizational Process 
Failure to cooperate in combating terrorism and other matters occurs for 
many reasons besides what we suppose are the perverse preferences of 
civil servants.  First, the very processes of government make cooperation 
difficult.204  
        -David Tucker 
a. Recruiting Process 
The simple process of recruiting personnel, and the fact that all entries are 
at the lowest level of the organization, creates an educational bias toward upward 
progression within the organization.  The military institution is a bureaucratic 
organization of several hieratical levels; therefore, in order to progress to the next level, 
individuals must come from the previous level of the organization.  This promotion 
process self-perpetuates the reinforced ideals of the organization.  While not always a 
“bad thing,” this phenomenon can create strong opposition to change within the 
institution. 
Because of the entry at the lowest level, there are no means of lateral entry 
into the organization.  In civilian companies lateral entry provides a fresh mind and 
alternate perspectives when trying to solve the organization's problems.  Lateral entry 
along with a promotion system based on skill rather than time in service could provide 
increased expertise and intellectual capital to the military organization. 
b. Promotion Process 
Throughout history, military organizations have been and remain 
extremely reluctant to reward innovators; however, when innovators were rewarded and 
positively identified, change was possible.  During the early 1900s, the Russians gave 
their innovators two bullets to the back of the head.  French militaries retired their  
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innovators prematurely.  On the other hand, in the 1920s German military embraced, 
tolerated, and promoted “mavericks”, such as, Gudarian, Hans von Seeckt, and Erwin 
Rommel which created “a climate ideally suited to innovation.”205  
Within the U.S. military today, current leadership is overemphasizing the 
importance of performing in the theaters of Iraq or Afghanistan at the expense of leaders 
using entirely different strategies in other theaters, regardless of the results.  “There is 
little to no diversity of thinking or attitude in the general officer ranks - selection boards 
are, in essence, a cloning process.”206 
The effect of new missions on career advancement is very interesting.  
According to Ferrell and Terriff, “no serving officer will be enthusiastic about 
undertaking something new that contravenes both their self- or corporate identity and 
their understanding of their promotional prospects.”207  Career preservation within the 
military organization creates a limited desire to effect change when faced with strong 
opposition because it could be extremely detrimental to career advancement. 
Avant and Lebovic, in their analysis of the U.S. military, have observed a 
linkage between new missions introduced to the officer corps and the officers' respective 
prospects for promotion.  As suspected, the two variables were inversely related.208  To 
the degree in which new missions deviate from accepted roles within the organization, 
the officers are more likely to reject them; because, “such new missions [would] alter 
their roles, and hence their particular identity” which would “adversely affect their 
prospects for advancement.”209 
Army Colonel John Nagl discusses in book, Learning to Eat Soup with a 
Knife, that the U.S. military failed to acknowledge the benefits of new ways of warfare 
during the Vietnam War because of the negative effect that this new warfare had on 
career potential within the organization.  As Nagl states, “the whole field of guerilla 
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operations was the burial place for the future of any officer who was sincerely interested 
in the development and application of guerrilla warfare.”210  No wonder alternative 
strategies and concepts, such as unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency 
operations remain supporting missions rather than supported missions, even though they 
are central components to winning the GWOT. 
H. COMMON MISCONCEPTION OF CULTURE 
Breaking culture . . . takes time and [sic] leadership and patience to bring 
people along, not only intellectually, but emotionally, to buy into the 
culture shifts….”211   
       -General Schoomaker 
Culture is given too much credit and too much blame. Culture is the 
“predispositions of members, the technology of the organization and the situational 
imperatives with which the agency must cope.”212  Therefore, analysts should place their 
attention on the particular tasks of the organization and how the organization performs 
the task or changes the task to create a “sense of mission.”213  Wilson says culture is 
formed by operators and that “figuring out how best to define tasks and motivate workers 
to perform those tasks is often described as creating the right organizational culture.”214  
It is a byproduct of the organization and the tasks that it performs and how it performs 
them.  “Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual.”215 
Military culture influences the intellectual capacity or mental models that allow 
ground, air, and maritime forces to train for and execute strategy.  However, what if there 
are multiple cultures within one organization?  According to Wilson, “when the 
organization stated goals are vague . . . these factors produce different definitions of core 
tasks for different people (or, more typically, different sub-units), [and] the organization 
will have several cultures.”216  A common mistake in identifying culture as either the 
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problem or solution within an organization is to assume that an organization will have a 
single culture.217  In the case of the military organization, there are multiple conflicting 
cultures, not just a single, homogenous one.   When this is the case, it becomes even 
harder to manipulate, identify, or gauge the culture.  Furthermore, sub-cultures play an 
enormous role in how the individuals within the organization see themselves.  Once the 
culture becomes the identity of the organization, the members of the organization will 
fight to death in order to defend it. 
As General Schoomaker indicated, in his review to the House Armed Services 
Committee, change is difficult in a strong culture especially if the new ideas are 
inconsistent with the culture of the organization.  However, there is a common 
misconception that leadership can shift culture directly.  Culture is itself a surfacing 
outcome of the organization’s leadership, people, and tasks rather than a tangible 
component that is controllable.218 
In Nagl’s examination of the British and U.S. Military, he attributes the disparity 
in change to the cultural differences in how the British and the Americans viewed 
doctrine.  The British saw that “Doctrine is not in itself a prescription for success as a set 
of rules.”219 
General Schoomaker emphasizes what he believes to be the most important 
takeaway from Nagl’s work: 
… the real study in that book is not about counterinsurgency, but it is 
about the difference in the British culture and our culture at those times 
and place and the difference in our learning organizations, our Armies as 
learning organizations, and the effect that culture had on them. … [W]hat 
we are trying to do is to educate, to roll lessons learned in, to train and to 
broaden and to become truly a learning culture in our Army so that we are 
adaptable and flexible...220 
The hazard of this thinking is that the military leadership can not focus on the 
organization's culture and believe that they can change or shift the culture in order to 
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improve the organization's system.  Culture is not a leverage point that is easily 
manipulated in an organization.  On the contrary, an “organization is a complex structure, 
not just a culture that can be manipulated and shifted in order to achieve desired 
results.”221  Culture is a way to recognize that there is a problem in the organization.  It is 
more of a measure of effectiveness in gauging an organization's capability to function, 
rather than a design factor that is easily manipulated or changed.  Therefore, culture is not 
a problem or a solution, but rather a measuring stick that can become a tremendous 
source of inertia, if it emerges out of a dysfunctional mix of component processes. 
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter makes one central assertion, that the current military's doctrine and 
structure determine strategy with little regard to the threat environment.  This chapter 
attributes this dysfunction to four major impediments of the military organization: 
recognizing and understanding the threat environment; implementing a strategy that is 
constrained by current technology; crafting a strategy that is dependent on a rigid 
doctrine; and developing a strategy that is confined by a legacy structure and its 
organizational processes and paradigms. 
This list is by no means all inclusive, and the identification of a barrier does not 
suggest a unilateral negative meaning for the concept.  The larger purpose of the chapter 
is to provide the innovator with a modest intelligence preparation of the battlefield of 
military change.  Several concepts within this chapter can be found to stimulate change in 
one subsystem, while retarding change in another. 
A bureaucracy, because of its foundation in equality and fairness, rules, 
regulations, and procedures, will have a difficult time overcoming these inhibitors of 
change.  The military must realize that its subsystems are in conflict with each other.  The 
rub lies between focusing on the threat and focusing on the organizational capabilities 
(i.e., doctrine, technology, and structure) in order to formulate an effective strategy.  
When these systems are in conflict, bureaucratic principles will not lessen the struggle.  
As General George S. Patton said, “it is not rules that lead to success in war but the 
indomitable spirit of the leader and his ability to motivate and inspire superhuman 
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performance.”222  The military organization must identify, develop, and harness those 
leaders who have the aptitude and perseverance to adjust the system, remove the 
inhibitors, and restore the flow of information in the prescribed directions. 
Before the military begins to change, members must ask themselves two 
questions. One, what is our threat and therefore, our strategic rationale? Two, how is this 
change in rationale, strategy, or perspective going to affect the entire system?  The 
current problem is that these questions require innovative and imaginative answers that 
must come from institutionalized minds within military organizations at the highest 
levels.  Which begs the question, “Can institutionalized minds provide innovative 
answers?”  That is a question worth exploring. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. REALIZING THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
Despite success in Desert Storm, during the mid 1990’s, the U.S. military 
leadership seemed to be aware of the new and unique threats beginning to emerge around 
the world.  It seemed that the national security environment was becoming increasingly 
vulnerable and potentially unstable.  Yet the need for change was felt very differently 
among the services. The Navy, having established itself as the world’s greatest Sea 
Power since WWI, unfortunately did not feel the threat until 2001 when the USS Cole 
was attacked by a small explosive laden boat while refueling in Aden Harbor, Yemen.  
The perceived success of the air war in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo served to 
reinforce the U.S. Air Force’s relatively conventional methodologies for targeting enemy 
forces. Today, the Air Force’s main thrust of effort in change is via a program called Air 
Force Smart Operations 21. This program focuses on changing internal processes to 
maximize value and decrease waste. Although useful, it remains to be seen if this 
internally focused program can help airmen cope with dynamic warfighting 
environments.  In contrast, the Army and its leadership felt relatively early that their 
organization and soldiers would be at the forefront of any and every battle against this 
seemingly new enemy.  Perhaps this inclination led the Army to realize that there must be 
a way to handle this dynamic and complex environment and become more flexible in 
dealing with these changes. 
From General Sullivan and Colonel Harper in 1996 to General Schoomaker today, 
Army leadership, and more recently the Air Force, have adopted the learning 
organization as the way ahead to become more adaptable to meet the growing demands of 
the ever-changing threat environment.  Unfortunately, the concept has never been truly 
understood or even conveyed service-wide.  Because of this, its successful 
implementation has been very limited.  Systems thinking has yet to be institutionalized 
among the services, but it is the cornerstone of a learning organization and what makes 
the other four disciplines work in synergy.   
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However, we argue in this thesis that we must step away from the idea of the 
learning organization.  It is our contention that the true meaning of this concept has been 
so diluted by misunderstanding and misuse that its intended effects may never be 
achieved.  Yet if we take one piece of this puzzle, the foundation of the concept, Systems 
Thinking, we appreciate that it can apply to every military organization and be very 
useful in not only realizing the need for change but understanding how these changes 
affect the entire system.  More importantly, through this approach, the reasons why 
military organizations are resistant to change can finally be realized and understood. 
B. WHY ARE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS RESISTANT TO CHANGE? 
It was the purpose of this thesis, to answer the question, “Why are military 
organizations resistant to change?”  Our hypothesis was that there are obvious barriers to 
change and specific learning disabilities within the military that create an inability and/or 
an unwillingness to adapt. What these disabilities were, we could only assume.  What we 
found was that this resistance comes from the absence of a sufficient framework to 
understand the relationships between the strategic, technological, doctrinal and 
organizational force structure components and the environment in which the military 
operates. 
By viewing the military as an open system, we offered two frameworks.  The 
first, the prescriptive framework, illustrated how each of these subsystems should interact 
and how, according to the literature, change should be affected.  The second, the 
theoretical framework, showed how different this prescriptive framework actually is from 
reality.  This theoretical framework illustrated these differences and where the resistance 
within the military system actually occurs.  What we find is that there are many barriers 
to effecting change to include doctrinal rigidity and a legacy force structure that is 
preserved by a dominant culture, the strength of mental models, the inability to identify 
or properly define the threat environment based on the misuse of history and the inability 
to learn from past failures. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In analyzing the military from a systems perspective it was never the goal to find 
the solution.  Consequently, our sole recommendation is that these frameworks be 
considered as one way, a different way, of categorizing the internal and external 
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environments.  In doing so, military leadership will be able to realize not only the need 
for change but how that change, whether within the doctrine, organization or strategy, 
will affect the entire system. It is understood that due to constraints such as technology 
and political pressure, the prescriptive framework provided is an ideal.  A systemic 
approach should serve military leaders well as they become more aware of what is 
causing the resistance to changes being implemented. Simply put, the systems approach 
to viewing change in the military can help identify sluggishness in the system and 
leverage points to help correct these deficiencies.  Those that practice this way of 
thinking say that it truly becomes a way of life.223  In a world, where not everything can 
be explained in a linear or black and white fashion, this way of life may be the way of 
future thinking. 
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